Exchange in markets with heterogeneous agents and trade frictions. by Ramezzana, Paolo
E x c h a n g e  in  M a r k e t s  w it h  H e t e r o g e n e o u s  
A g e n t s  a n d  T r a d e  F r ic t io n s
Paolo Ramezzana 
The London School of Economics and Political Science
A thesis submitted for the Ph.D. degree in Economics
June, 2002
1
UMI Number: U61BB36
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U613336
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
s yy/.
j
PH i .
Abstract
This thesis studies the implications of heterogeneity in consumers’ incomes or pref­
erences for market equilibrium and welfare in a world characterized by economies of 
scale and trade frictions.
The first chapter studies how the level and the distribution of per capita income 
affects industrial demand and thus the process of economic development in a closed 
economy, and the volume of international trade in an integrated world. In a closed 
economy with given aggregate GDP, countries with intermediate per capita income 
levels and population sizes have a larger number of industrial sectors than very rich 
and small or very poor and large countries. Furthermore, income inequality has a 
positive effect on the level of industrialization in poor economies, whereas the level 
of industrialization in rich economies is maximized by perfect equality. Finally, when 
international trade is possible, the volume of trade between two countries is increasing 
in the similarity of their per capita incomes.
The second chapter studies product selection by producers in markets where con­
sumers have idiosyncratic preferences for different varieties of a good and have to 
search for their preferred variety. I show that the market share of the variety pre­
ferred by the majority is always higher than in a frictionless Walrasian market and 
increases with the severity of search frictions. For given search frictions, a consumer 
is better off when the group to which she belongs becomes larger, and, for given con­
sumer group sizes, a fall in search frictions benefits minority consumers relatively more 
than majority consumers. I also study under what conditions mass consumption is a 
constrained-optimal outcome and the role played by the ability of producers to price 
discriminate.
The third chapter uses a standard monopolistically competitive model of interna­
tional trade, in which countries have different preferences, to evaluate the often-heard 
argument that globalization endangers the culture of small countries. In the equi­
librium of this model, an increase in economic integration considerably reduces the 
market share of the varieties typical of the culture of the small country. However, 
if integration is caused by a reduction in real transport costs, it nevertheless bene­
fits consumers in this country. The model also shows that a country that is not too 
small relative to the dominant country can increase its welfare by adopting a limited 
level of trade protection, whereas for a very small country free trade is optimal. This 
model can be used to evaluate the economic implications of the principle of “cultural 
exception”, invoked by France to protect its film industry.
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Introduction
Diversity occupies a central place in economics: it is arguably diversity in peo­
ple’s abilities and preferences, and the opportunities for trade that arise because 
of this diversity, that make economic theory an interesting and powerful disci­
pline. One of the most remarkable achivements of neo-classical economics has 
indeed been to show how a decentralized market can thrive in the presence of di­
versity, by having the price mechanism co-ordinate the actions of a great number 
of heterogeneous agents and leading, under certain conditions, to the efficient 
use of scarce resources. In a neo-classical, perfectly competitive world, with no 
economies of scale in production and no imperfect information, not only can the 
market cope with diversity, but diversity is generally a good thing, as economic 
agents can benefit from specialization in production. This is for instance the 
case in the neo-classical theory of international trade, in which specialization 
according to comparative advantage allows countries to gain from trade. Fur­
thermore, in such a perfectly competitive world, not only is diversity good for 
social welfare in the aggregate, but it also pays off for each single individual to 
be different: an agent is usually better off the more different from the rest of the 
population she is. In other words, an individual would usually like to differenti­
ate her productive skills or her preferences over consumption alternatives from 
the rest of the population if given the opportunity to do so at a reasonable cost. 
For example, in a perfectly competitive labor market a worker can command a 
premium if she is one of few people to have some skills that are in short supply; 
or in a competitive market for final goods a consumer would like to be the only 
one to have a strong preference for a given good, as in equilibrium she would pay
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less for this good. However, although the neo-classical model of perfect compe­
tition is a useful benchmark for thinking about the way in which many markets 
work, an indiscriminate application of its conclusions would often lead to an 
over-statement of the advantages of diversity. In many real world situations, 
characterized by the existence of scale economies in production and of transport 
costs or search frictions in trade, the possibility arises that heterogeneity among 
participants in a market can indeed reduce the scope for trade and can make 
some agents with very peculiar characteristics worse off. The majority of this 
thesis is devoted to the theoretical study of instances in which these situations 
may arise.
More precisely, this thesis studies how the distribution across consumers 
of certain characteristics, such as per capita income and preferences, affects 
equilibrium outcomes in markets in which economies of scale in production or 
search frictions are important. In the remainder of this introduction I will give 
a brief account of the topics studied in the three chapters that follow, and will 
briefly clarify how the contribution presented in each of them relates to existing 
research. I refer the reader to the introduction and related literature section 
of each single chapter for a much more precise and detailed discussion of its 
contents.
Chapter 1 presents a model in which the level of demand -  specifically, of 
demand for goods that can only be produced using increasing returns to scale 
technologies -  plays a crucial role in determining the success or failure of in­
dustrialization in closed economies and the pattern and volume of international 
trade in an integrated world. In particular, I use this model to analyze the sep­
arate effects of average income, income distribution, and population size, first 
on the equilibrium number of industrial sectors in an economy in which inter­
national trade is prohibitively costly, and then on the pattern of specialization 
and the volume of trade in an integrated world. The observation that the ex­
tent of the market is a crucial factor for the successful industrialization of an 
economy is obviously not new, as it has occupied a central role in economics 
since Adam Smith’s work. In most standard monopolistically competitive gen­
eral equilibrium models which are now used to study these issues -  see, e.g., 
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Spence (1976), and Krugman (1980) -  the number of 
increasing returns to scale sectors of an economy increases with its market size, 
generally measured as the size of the labor force. However, these models are 
rather vague about the separate roles played by the size of the labor force in 
overcoming indivisibilities in production and in determining sufficient demand. 
In particular, they cannot analyze the separate channels through which popu­
lation size, per capita income, and income distribution affect demand, because 
the type of consumers’ preferences that they use poses no aggregation problem, 
i.e. market demand depends only on an economy’s aggregate income. In these 
models there is no difference between a country with low per capita income and 
large population and a country with high per capita income and small popula­
tion, provided that they have roughly the same aggregate GDP. Analogously, in 
these models income distribution plays no role in determining the extent of the 
market for industrial products, provided that aggregate GDP is held roughly 
constant. In other words, once the effect of aggregate GDP on industrialization 
has been controlled for, these models do not provide any insight into the role 
played by the level and the distribution of per capita income. In Chapter 1, 
by treating demand aggregation in more detail than in previous contributions, I 
present a more precise analysis of the relevant market for industrial products. In 
particular, I use a model in which individuals consume divisible amounts of food, 
produced under constant returns to scale, and possibly many industrial goods, 
produced under increasing returns to scale. Since the marginal utility of food is 
assumed to be decreasing and consumers are assumed to derive utility only from 
the first unit of each industrial good, the level and distribution of per capita in­
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come matter for demand, as richer consumers are willing to spend more of their 
income on industrial goods than poorer consumers. For given prices, higher 
average income is therefore conducive to more industrialization. However, in a 
closed economy with given aggregate GDP, higher average income also means a 
smaller population size and thus a higher average cost of production, which has 
a negative effect on industrialization.1 I analyze how these two effects combine 
to determine the equilibrium number of industrial sectors for different levels 
of per capita income. I also show that income inequality reduces the number 
of industrial sectors in an already rich economy but could help jump-start the 
process of industrialization in poor economies.
The model presented here can also be fruitfully used to explain a well-known 
stylized fact in international economics. This is the observation that, contrary 
to the predictions of the standard Heckscher-Ohlin theory of international trade, 
over the last decades a large share of world trade has taken place between coun­
tries at similar stages of economic development and with rather similar factor 
endowments. The volume of trade among developed countries largely outweighs 
the volume of trade between the former group and developing countries. One 
of the first economists to present systematic evidence hereon was Linder (1961), 
who in his now classic study of these issues shows that the volume of trade 
between two countries is increasing in the similarity between their per capita 
incomes, even after controlling for their aggregate GDP. The explanation that 
he proposes, known as the Linder hypothesis, relies on the different demand 
structures of poor and rich countries: poor countries tend to consume many 
less product varieties than rich countries do and this severely limits the scope 
for trade between the former and the latter, as the varieties that are demanded 
in rich countries tend, at least in the first phases of the product cycle, to be
^ o t e  that, throughout Chapter 1, I will keep aggregate GDP (but not necessarily per 
capita income and population size) constant, since, as mentioned above, the importance of 
total market size for industrialization has been already established in the existing literature.
10
produced there and traded only with other rich countries. The patterns of spe­
cialization and the predictions on the volume of trade implied by the Linder 
hypothesis arise naturally in the model of Chapter 1.
Chapter 2 studies markets in which consumer groups of different sizes have 
idiosyncratic preferences over differentiated goods and in which trade is charac­
terized by search frictions. The analysis developed in this chapter is inspired by 
the effects that recent advances in telecommunication technologies, and espe­
cially the diffusion of the Internet, seem to have had on product markets. As a 
casual visit to one of the major on-line retailers of music CDs, books, or software 
reveals, the reduction in search costs between producers and consumers caused 
by the Internet has dramatically increased the availability of product varieties. 
In particular, it seems that a great number of varieties that appeal to small 
numbers of consumers have been introduced in the market. The fact that a 
reduction in search costs has increased the market share of products that appeal 
to minorities suggests that there could be a relationship between the level of 
search costs and the degree of diversity in consumption in a market economy. In 
particular, it seems to suggest that high search costs lead to an equilibrium in 
which producers specialize mostly, if not exclusively, in varieties that appeal to 
the tastes of large groups of consumers and overlook therefore the preferences of 
minorities. To address these issues, Chapter 2 presents a model of a market in 
which there are two groups of consumers with different sizes and with idiosyn­
cratic preferences over two varieties of a differentiated good. Since consumers 
and producers have imperfect information about each other’s location, trade is 
characterized by search frictions. In the equilibrium of this model, the market 
share of the variety preferred by a majority of consumers is always higher than in 
the frictionless Walrasian equilibrium and increases with the severity of search 
frictions. It can also be shown that, as a consequence of these properties of 
the equilibrium, a fall in search frictions benefits minority consumers relatively
11
more than majority consumers. Furthermore, the model exhibits consumption 
externalities, in that an increase in the size of a group of consumers benefits each 
memebr of this group and damages the members of other groups. This happens 
because in this model the composition of production over-responds to changes 
in the composition of demand. Finally, the model can be used to evaluate the 
efficiency of the market equilibrium. For very severe search frictions the mar­
ket outcome, characterized by very little diversity in production, is constrained 
optimal, whereas for lower levels of search frictions the market provides too lit­
tle diversity compared to the optimal composition of production that would be 
chosen by an unborn individual behind a veil of ignorance as to his preferences. 
A discussion of the effects of price discrimination on the welfare of minority and 
majority consumers concludes the chapter.
The topics studied in Chapter 2 are related to the work of Michael Spence 
(1976), who studies product selection in the presence of fixed costs when there 
are no search frictions. Some of the mechanisms at work in the model presented 
in this chapter are very similar to those underlying recent developments in the 
literature on wage inequality in labour markets. In particular, Daron Acemoglu 
(1996, 1998, 1999) and Stephen Machin and Alan Manning (1997) show that, 
as a consequence of imperfect information and matching frictions, an increase 
in the supply of a particular type of labor leads to a more-than-proportional 
increase in the number of firms using a technology designed for that particular 
type of labor. Similarly, in the model presented in Chapter 2 changes in the 
composition of the demand base cause more-than-proportional changes in the 
composition of supply.
Chapter 3 uses economic analysis to shed some light on the debate about the 
effects of globalization on cultural diversity. Many commentators, especially in 
Europe, argue that increasing economic integration has resulted in the cultural 
predominance of the United States. In particular, they claim that most national
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markets for cultural goods, such as films, TV shows, books, and music are awash 
with American products. Available data for the film industry seem to confirm 
these claims, as American films command 85% of the world market and 90% of 
the European market. The conclusion that some European commentators draw 
is that this state of things is necessarily bad for consumers outside the United 
States and that therefore other countries should be allowed to protect their cul­
ture and, with it, their cultural industries. This concerns, expressed especially 
by France, were allegedly the reason for the “Television without Frontiers” Di­
rective, passed by the European Commission in 1989. This directive imposed 
very strict quotas on the showing of non-European films, that were also de facto 
subjected to a discriminatory tax treatment. In 1993 these discriminatory mea­
sures were challenged by the United States during the trade liberalization talks 
of the GATT, but were successfully defended by France, which invoked the prin­
ciple of “Cultural Exception”, according to which cultural industries should not 
be exposed to liberalization to the same extent as other sectors.
To analyze these issues, I develop a monopolistically competitive model of 
international trade in which cultural varieties are produced under increasing 
returns to scale and can be traded at some cost between two countries of asym­
metric size. This standard framework is extended by assuming that consumers 
have a stronger preference for varieties that are typical of the culture of their own 
country than for varieties that are typical of the culture of the other country. In 
the equilibrium of this model an increase in economic integration considerably 
reduces the market share of the varieties typical of the culture of the small coun­
try. However, if integration is caused by a reduction in real transport costs, it 
nevertheless benefits the consumers of this country. The model also shows that 
a country that is not too small relative to the dominant country can increase 
its welfare by adopting a limited level of trade protection, whereas for a very 
small country free trade is optimal. This seems to suggest that some limited
13
degree of cultural protection could make sense for a relatively large country like 
France, but would be detrimental for small countries such as the Scandinavian 
countries or the Netherlands, which have in fact been historically very open to 
the consumption of American and English cultural products.
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Chapter 1
Per Capita Income and Industrial 
Dem and in Economic D evelopm ent and  
International Trade
1.1 Introduction
In this chapter I present a model in which the level of demand for goods that can 
only be produced using increasing returns to scale technologies plays a crucial 
role in determining the success or failure of industrialization in closed economies 
and the pattern and volume of international trade in an integrated world. In par­
ticular, I use this model to analyze the separate effects of average income, income 
distribution, and population size first on the equilibrium number of industrial 
sectors in an economy in which international trade is prohibitively costly and 
then on the pattern of specialization and the volume of trade in an integrated 
world in which economies can trade with each other. An important feature of 
the model in this chapter is that, contrary to previous contributions, it allows 
me to investigate the issues mentioned above while maintaining quite natural 
assumptions about technology, market structure, and price-setting by firms and 
provides therefore an interesting and relatively simple way of studying the im­
portance of non-competitive pricing in the process of economic development.
Most of the growth in the economic well-being of large parts of the world over 
the last two centuries can certainly be attributed to the discovery and successive 
large-scale production at affordable prices of a great variety of new products and
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services, the production of which, almost without exception, requires substan­
tial fixed R&D and production costs. This expansion of the menu of available 
products has also played an important role in fostering the growth of world 
trade. Many factors, such as fundamental breakthroughs in basic science and 
the establishment of appropriate institutional frameworks that protect intellec­
tual property, have certainly had a crucial impact on these developments, but 
the latter could simply not have happened if there had been insufficient demand 
to cover the fixed costs of innovation and production. Indeed, the importance 
of the extent of the market for industrialization has become one of the deep­
est and most widely held convictions of the economic profession, starting with 
Adam Smith’s work until our days. Research in this field has flourished since 
Avinash Dixit and Joseph Stiglitz (1977) and Michael Spence (1976) have pro­
vided tractable models of monopolistic competition within which to study the 
relationship between fixed costs, industrial variety, and non-competitive pric­
ing. Subsequently, Paul Krugman (1979, 1980), Kenneth Judd (1985), and Paul 
Romer (1990) have shown the potential of these models in explaining the im­
portance of market size for the dynamics of innovation and international trade.
Why, then, another model on the extent of the market, industrialization, 
and international trade? A short answer to this question is that, by treating 
demand aggregation in more detail than in previous contributions, the model 
in this chapter can help define the extent of the relevant market for industrial 
products more precisely and can therefore greatly improve the ability of existing 
theories to explain different development realities. In all the monopolistically 
competitive models of industrialization and international trade cited above, pref­
erences pose no aggregation problem and market demand depends only on an 
economy’s aggregate income, as measured by its GDP. In these models there is 
no difference between a country with low per capita income and large popula­
tion and a country with high per capita income and small population, provided
16
that they have roughly the same aggregate GDP. Analogously, in these models 
income distribution plays no role in determining the extent of the market for 
industrial products, provided that aggregate GDP is held roughly constant. In 
other words, once the effect of aggregate GDP on industrialization has been 
controlled for, these models do not provide any insight into the role played by 
the level and the distribution of per capita income in an economy. To see why 
this is an important shortcoming, consider the following example. Germany and 
India have roughly the same PPP-adjusted aggregate GDP, but Germany has a 
population that is more than ten times smaller than India’s, and, consequently, a 
PPP-adjusted per capita income that is more than ten times higher than India’s.1 
If taken literally, most general equilibrium monopolistically competitive models 
would conclude that, since these two countries have the same aggregate GDP 
and thus the same market size, one should expect them to have the same level 
of industrialization. However, virtually no businessman considering whether to 
supply some innovative and rather expensive non-tradable service, such as laser 
eye-surgery or high-speed train connections, would consider the Indian market 
to be nearly as profitable as the richer, though smaller, German market. Most 
Indians would not have the necessary resources to afford these services, and the 
relevant market for them would be much smaller in India than in Germany.
There is indeed systematic evidence that the level of per capita income and 
population size are important factors in explaining industrialization. Hollis Ch- 
enery, Sherman Robinson, and Moshe Syrquin (1986), in a detailed cross-section 
and time-series study of the industrialization experience of some selected coun­
tries, provide evidence that demand, as explained mainly by per capita income,
1In 1999 India had an aggregate PPP-adjusted Gross National Income of 2,226 billion 
dollars, a population of 998 million people, and a PPP-adjusted per capita income of 2,230 
dollars. In the same year, Germany had a PPP-adjusted aggregate Gross National Income of 
1,930 billion dollars (approximately 0.9 times that of India), a population of 82 million people 
(approximately 12 times smaller than that of India), and a PPP-adjusted per capita income 
of 23,510 dollars (approximately 10 times higher than that of India). All data are from the 
World Development Indicators 2001, The World Bank.
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has played an important role in determining the decline of agriculture and the 
rise of industrial sectors in virtually all of the countries that they study.2 A 
larger population allows countries to industrialize at lower levels of per capita 
income, but cannot completely compensate for the negative effects of low levels 
of per capita income on industrial demand.
Besides the level of average income, income distribution also plays an impor­
tant role in determining the extent of demand for industrial products. Kevin 
Murphy, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny (1989) discuss several examples in 
which too much or too little concentration of wealth seem to have constituted 
an obstacle to industrial development. David Landes (1969) discusses how the 
level of per capita income, and especially its distribution among different classes, 
may have been crucial in determining sufficient demand during the early stages 
of the British industrial revolution.
The model that I present in this chapter provides the first theoretical analysis 
of the relationship between average, or per capita, income and industrialization 
and offers an alternative framework within which to study the effects of income 
distribution, effects that have also been considered in Murphy, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1989) and Kiminori Matsuyama (2002). The next section will explain 
in some detail the differences between these two models and mine.
The model presented here can also be fruitfully used to explain a well-known 
stylized fact of International Economics. This is the observation that, contrary 
to the predictions of the standard Heckscher-Ohlin theory of international trade, 
over the last decades a large share of world trade has taken place between coun­
tries at similar stages of economic development and with rather similar factor 
endowments. The volume of trade among developed countries largely outweighs 
the volume of trade between the former group and developing countries. While
2However, it should be noted that, although domestic demand plays an important role 
in explaining industrialization, their findings show that other factors, and especially export 
demand and shifts in the supply side of the economy, play an equally, if not even more, 
important role.
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the relatively low volume of North-South trade could be partly explained by 
many years of protectionist trade regimes in developing countries and by the 
small economic size of the developing world,3 it may also be, at least in part, 
the consequence of very different demand structures between the two regions. 
In his now classic study of these issues, Staffan Linder (1961) presents evidence 
that the volume of trade between two countries is increasing in the similarity 
between their per capita income, even after controlling for their aggregate GDP. 
The explanation of this fact that he proposes, known as the Linder hypothesis, 
relies on the different demand structures of countries with low and high per 
capita income: poor countries tend to consume many less product varieties than 
rich countries do and this severely limits the scope for trade between the former 
and the latter, as the varieties that axe demanded in rich countries tend, at 
least in the first phases of the product cycle, to be produced there and traded 
only with other rich countries. In other words, and returning to our previous 
example involving Germany and India, virtually no businessman who considers 
exporting the latest version of a DVD-player would consider these two markets 
to have an equivalent potential, as he knows that he will be able to export 
many more DVD-players to the, smaller but wealthier, European country than 
to India. The model that I present below clearly shows how similarity in per 
capita income, combined with economies of scale in production and trade costs, 
determines the pattern and the volume of bilateral trade.4
In order to address the issues outlined above, this chapter starts by analyzing 
an economy in which individuals consume divisible amounts of food, that is 
produced under constant returns to scale, and possibly many industrial goods, 
produced under increasing returns to scale. Since the marginal utility of food is
3James Markusen and Randall Wigle (1990) use a constant returns to scale, perfectly 
competitive, computable general equilibrium model of world trade to show that a liberalisation 
of world trade and an increase in the economic size of the developing world would considerably 
increase the volume of North-South and South-South relative to North-North trade.
4The next section will present a brief discussion of theoretical and empirical contributions 
that are closely related to the international trade implications of my model.
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assumed to be decreasing and consumers are assumed to derive utility only from 
the first unit of each industrial goods, the level and distribution of per capita 
income matters for demand, as richer consumers are willing to spend more of 
their income on industrial goods than poorer consumers. For given prices, higher 
average income is therefore conducive to more industrialization. However, in a 
closed economy with given aggregate GDP, higher average income also means a 
smaller population size and thus a higher average cost of production, which has 
a negative effect on industrialization.5 I analyze how these two effects combine 
to determine the equilibrium number of industrial sectors for different levels 
of per capita income. I also show that income inequality reduces the number 
of industrial sectors in an already rich economy but could help jump-start the 
process of industrialization in poor economies. Finally, I consider a world with 
two countries that can trade their goods at some cost, and show that the patterns 
of specialization and the predictions on the volume of trade implied by the Linder 
hypothesis arise naturally in this model.
The remainder of the chapter is in five sections. Section 1.2 discusses where 
the existing literature stands as regards the implications of per capita income and 
demand for economic development and international trade. Section 1.3 sets out 
the model of a closed economy and analyzes the implications of different levels of 
average income and income distributions for industrialization. Section 1.4 uses 
this model to study international trade between two countries with different 
per capita income levels and derives results that constitute a formal version 
of Linder’s insights. Section 1.5 discusses the implications of my approach for 
the distribution of gains from trade between and within countries. Section 1.6 
concludes.
5Note that throughout the chapter I will keep aggregate GDP (but not necessarily per 
capita income and population size) constant, since, as mentioned above, the positive effects 
of greater aggregate GDP for industrialization have been already established in the existing 
literature.
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1.2 R elated  literature
1.2.1 Developm ent Economics
The issues studied in this chapter are closely related to those considered by 
Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989, MSV hereafter) and by Matsuyama (2002). 
However, the approach taken here differs in some important respects from these 
two contributions.
MSV consider an economy in which consumers have a minimum food con­
sumption requirement, after which the marginal utility of food drops discretely 
and consumers begin to derive utility from a variety of indivisible manufac­
tured goods. Manufactured goods can be produced by a monopolist using an 
increasing returns to scale technology with high fixed and low marginal costs or 
by a competitive fringe using a constant returns to scale technology with high 
marginal cost. MSV consider the effects of income distribution on the equilib­
rium share of sectors that adopt increasing returns to scale technologies, rather 
than on the number of goods, and thus of manufacturing sectors, which they 
take as exogenously given. This is a consequence of the assumption that man­
ufactured goods can also be produced under constant returns to scale. This as­
sumption makes the optimal pricing problem very tractable in their model, since 
all active monopolists will charge a price equal to the constant marginal cost 
of the competitive fringe, but has some other important drawbacks. In reality 
many of the most important innovations in the process of economic development 
could simply not have been carried out by a competitive fringe without bearing 
substantial fixed costs; one needs only think of transportation systems, drugs, 
high-tech electronic systems, etc. If these goods and services are introduced at 
all, they usually can be produced by only few firms and non-competitive pricing 
becomes therefore crucially important. My model shows how monopolistically 
competitive firms unchallenged by a competitive fringe set their prices optimally 
according to the level and distribution of per capita income in the economy, and
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it does so without giving up tractability. Optimal price-setting has important 
implications for the number of industrial sectors that can profitably operate, as 
a smaller but richer customer base might be willing to pay more for innovations 
than a larger and poorer one. Since the monopolists in MSV do not adjust their 
prices when per capita income changes, they only care about the size of the 
customer base, and not about the elasticity of demand for industrial products, 
as determined by per capita income. Furthermore, MSV’s assumption that the 
marginal utility of food is almost everywhere constant, except at the point where 
it drops discretely, implies that their model does not have much to say about the 
effects of average income on industrialization, once aggregate income has been 
controlled for. The setup of the present model allows me to address this issue 
in a rather detailed and tractable way.
Matsuyama (2002) also considers the effects of income distribution on indus­
trialization, and particularly on the emergence of a mass consumption society, 
in which large parts of the population have access to a large variety of industri­
ally produced goods. He uses a model in which perfectly competitive producers 
have access to a technology which is characterized by dynamic scale economies 
and in which endogenous productivity growth plays an important role. In Mat­
suyama’s model, consumption of a given good by the upper class makes it chaper 
to produce in successive periods and therefore affordable to poorer classes. This 
“trickle-down” effect is accompanied by a “trickle-up” effect, whereby consump­
tion of goods by the lower classes reduces the price of these goods for the upper 
classes, allowing them to devote some of their resources to the purchase of new 
goods. A virtuous circle of innovation becomes therefore possible in this econ­
omy. Matsuyama shows that if a society is too egalitarian this virtuous circle 
will never start, whereas if it is too inegalitarian it will easily stop. Although 
my model also addresses the effects of income distribution on industrialization, 
it does so in a static context and does not deal with technological change.
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1.2.2 International Trade
When looking for theoretical explanations of the empirical relevance of North- 
North trade, economists usually turn to monopolistically competitive models of 
international trade,6 as introduced in Paul Krugman (1979, 1980) and Elhanan 
Helpman (1981) and consolidated in Helpman and Krugman (1985). These 
models have developed a consistent general equilibrium framework to analyze 
how product differentiation and increasing returns to scale in production can give 
rise to trade even in the absence of comparative advantage. In particular, these 
models predict that the volume of trade should be large between countries with 
large and similar market size, as measured by aggregate GDP -see also Helpman 
(1987). In these models, once one controls for the effects of aggregate GDP, per 
capita income can have effects on the volume and composition of trade only if it 
is related in some way to factor endowments and therefore to the supply side of 
the economy. Helpman and Krugman (1985, Chapter 8) analyze this possibility 
by using a model that combines differences in factor endowments with economies 
of scale and imperfect competition, and by assuming that higher levels of per 
capita income correspond to greater capital abundance. They find that one 
should expect the share of intra-industry trade in total trade to be higher in 
trade flows between countries with similar per capita income levels. However, in 
their framework, once the level of GDP has been controlled for, the total volume 
of bilateral trade is still maximized between countries with different relative 
capital abundance, and thus with different levels of per capita income. To see 
this, consider the integrated world equilibrium box in Figure 1.1. This figure 
represents a world with two countries, two factors of production (K  and L), 
and two sectors (X  and Y).  Each sector has many monopolistically competitive 
firms. The amounts of the two factors of production used by sectors X  and 
Y  are represented by the segments 0]W and OiK, respectively, and sector X
6However, see Davis (1997) for an alternative neoclassical model.
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Figure 1.1: The integrated world equilibrium.
is therefore capital intensive. For all factor endowments inside the quadrangle 
O1 XO2 Y , factor prices are equalized and both countries use the same capital- 
labor ratios in both sectors. Also, note that at all factor endowment points 
along a line such as DD' -  e.g. point E  -  total GDP in each of the two countries 
is constant, and that the total GDPs of the two countries become more similar 
the nearer to the center, represented by point C, one moves. In a world as the 
one described in Figure 1.1, the volume of intra-industry trade is maximized 
when the factor endowments of the two countries he on the B B ' line, since on 
this line the two countries have identical GDPs. However, the total volume of 
trade, including both intra-industry and inter-industry trade, is maximized at 
A  or A \  since at this point the volume of Heckscher-Olin trade is maximized 
for given volume of intra-industry trade. Points A or A' imply rather different 
capital-labor ratios, and thus different per capita income levels, between the two
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countries, a prediction at odds with available evidence.7
The implications of per capita income for the composition of demand and 
thus for the volume of trade have been carefully considered from a theoretical 
point of view by James Markusen (1986) and Kiminori Matsuyama (2001) and 
shown to be empirically relevant in Linda Hunter and Markusen (1988) and 
Hunter (1991).8 Markusen considers a case in which the income elasticity of 
the demand for capital intensive goods is greater than one and shows that as 
the relative factor endowments, and thus relative per capita incomes, of the 
North and the South become more dissimilar, the volume of North-North trade 
increases relative to the volume of North-South trade. Intuitively, this happens 
because every region tends to consume relatively more of the good in which it 
is becoming progressively more specialized. However, the assumption that the 
production of the high income elasticity good is relatively intensive in the factor 
that is in relatively abundant supply in the rich country is crucial: if it were 
reversed, so would be the results. Although Markusen’s framework neatly cap­
tures some of the aspects of Linder’s reasoning, the two differ markedly in one 
respect: whereas demand is crucial in determining which country develops new 
products in the Linder hypothesis, it has no implication for specialization in 
Markusen’s model. In the latter it is relative factor endowments that determine 
independently both inter-industry specialization, through technology, and the 
composition of demand, through per capita income: only if the two effects hap­
pen to operate in the same direction Linder’s conclusion regarding the volume 
of trade obtains. The model presented in this chapter generates instead Linder-
7In monopolistically competitive models with only one factor, as in Krugman (1979, 1980), 
the volume of trade is constant with respect to per capita income once total GDP has been 
controlled for.
8Hunter and Markusen (1988) estimate a linear expenditure system for 34 countries and 
11 commodity groups and reject the hypothesis of homothetic preferences at very high levels 
of statistical significance. Hunter (1991), using the same methodology and data as in the 
previous paper, compares actual trade flows to those that would obtain in a counterfactual 
world with homothetic preferences, and shows that the volume of trade would increase by 29 
percent if preferences were indeed homothetic.
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type results without having to rely on any assumption on factor intensities.
Matsuyama (2000) also analyzes the implications of non-homothetic prefer­
ences for international trade. His model is however rather different from my 
model, as he assumes constant returns to scale and perfect competition in pro­
duction and focuses mostly on the implications of differences in per capita income 
for the terms of trade rather than for the volume of trade.
1.3 T he C losed Econom y M odel
Consider a stylized economy that is inhabited by a continuum of N  individuals. 
Individual k is endowed with y(k) effective units of the only factor of production, 
labor, so that the total labor supply in the economy is equal to Y  =  y(k)dk 
effective units. Higher individual endowments of effective units of labor can be 
interpreted as higher individual productivity levels, which I take as exogenously 
given. This set up will be used in the rest of the chapter to compare economies 
with equal levels of Y,  and thus, given the assumptions that follow, with equal 
levels of aggregate GDP, but with different population sizes -  and thus levels of 
per capita income -  and different income distributions. This economy produces 
a good z (e.g., food), under perfect competition and using a constant returns 
to scale technology that requires one effective unit of labor per unit of output 
produced. This good is used as numeraire and its price normalized to one; this 
implies that the wage rate per effective unit of labor is also unity, since, as I 
shall show, some positive amount of z will always be produced in equilibrium. 
Individual fc’s income, expressed in units of the numeraire good, is therefore 
equal to her endowment of effective units of labor y(k). Besides this constant 
returns to scale good, this economy also knows how to produce a continuum 
of varieties of a manufactured good, with each particular variety being denoted 
by the index i G [0, oo). Each variety is produced under increasing returns to 
scale, with a fixed amount of F  effective units of labor and a marginal labor
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requirement of c effective units. I assume that the manufacturing sector is 
characterised by free entry and exit of firms, and accordingly I model it as 
being monopolistically competitive. I also make the crucial assumption that, 
while the numeraire good z can be bought in any divisible amount, available 
manufactured varieties axe indivisible and consumers derive utility only from 
the first unit of each variety that they consume. Namely, I assume that all 
consumers have identical preferences and choose z £ [0, oo) and x(i) £ {0,1}, 
for all i, to maximize the following additively separable utility function
U = u(z) +  [  x{i)di, (1.1)
Jo
subject to
z +  f  p(i)x(i)di = y(k); (1.2)
Jo
where p(i) is the price of variety i and n is the total number of varieties that the 
individual chooses to consume. Furthermore I assume that u'(-) > 0, u"{-) < 0,
and lim2_o u'{z ) =  00• These assumptions imply that the marginal utility of
income u'(z) is decreasing in income and that some positive amount of z  is 
always produced in equilibrium.
1.3.1 Equilibrium w ith perfect equality
In this section I analyze the equilibrium of a perfectly egalitarian closed economy 
where all consumers have income y(k) = y. The effects of income distribution 
on industrialization and product variety are discussed in the next section. 
Assume that each consumer is simultaneously offered the numeraire good z and 
many industrial varieties at prices given by the function p(i). Let manufactured 
varieties be indexed in such a way that p{i) is non-decreasing in i. Since the 
consumer purchases a quantity of each variety which is equal to either zero or 
one, she effectively chooses only z and how many and which of the available
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manufactured varieties to consume. Since all varieties are equally indivisible 
and enter utility symmetrically, the consumer always chooses to purchase the n 
cheapest varieties. This means that x(i) = 1 for all z < n and she chooses n by 
solving the following maximization problem
max u ^ y  — J  p(z)dz^-fn, s.t. n > 0. (1-3)
The first order condition of this problem is given by
<p(n), (1-4)
u' (y ~  J?p(i)di)
with equality if n > 0 and strict inequality if n = 0. The interpretation of (1.4) 
is straightforward: consumers will expand their consumption of manufactured 
varieties up to the point where the marginal benefit from variety, given by the 
left hand side of (1.4), is equal to its marginal cost, given by the right hand side 
of (1.4), when both are measured in terms of the numeraire good z.
Next I turn to the production side of the economy, in which firms are free 
to enter and choose prices as to maximize their profits. I first determine the 
profit-maximizing price profile p(z) for given number n of active firms; then I 
use the implications of free entry in the market to determine the number n of 
active firms.
The first important result is that, for any given number of firms n > 0, the 
unique profit-maximizing price profile is p(i) = p* for all i < n such that
1 =/>*• (1.5)u' (y — np*)
This can be proved as follows. For any given profile of prices p(z), i < n,
firm n chooses an optimal price p(n) = p* such that [u' (y — J^p ^d z)]-1 =  p*,
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since the firm’s profit would be increasing for any price that were strictly less 
than p* and would drop to zero for any price that were strictly greater than p*. 
Since p(n) =  p* and p(i) is non-decreasing by assumption, in order to prove that 
p(i) = p* for all i < n, I only need to prove that p(i) cannot be strictly increasing 
on [0, n]. If p(i) were strictly increasing over some range of this interval, firms 
with low indexes over this range, and thus with low prices, could increase their 
profits by slightly increasing their price, because consumers would drop higher 
indexed goods from their consumption bundle first, and thus the deviating firm 
could increase its price without losing any demand, which would obviously be a 
profitable deviation. This establishes that p(i) = p* for all i < n  is indeed the 
unique profit-maximizing equilibrium price profile for given n.
By looking at equation (1.5) one can see that, since u"(-) < 0, the profit- 
maximizing price p* charged by each active firm is increasing in the level of 
the economy’s per capita income y, for any given n. Intuitively, consumers de­
rive lower marginal utility from food in richer markets and are therefore willing 
to spend more on each manufactured variety Therefore, if the market power of 
incumbent firms were not eroded by the entry of new firms, the former could 
charge higher prices for their goods in richer markets.9
However, in an equilibrium with free entry, the ability of firms to charge high 
prices for their goods is constrained by the threat of entry by possible competi­
tors. In particular, free entry ensures that in equilibrium all active firms charge 
a price equal to average cost
P* =  c + j j  =  C + fy .  (1.6)
where /  =  (F / Y ) is the fixed cost of each variety normalized by effective labor 
supply and I have made use of the fact that Y  = Ny. Note that, since Y  is
9This possibly important effect, which emerges quite naturally in this model, is not present 
in other models of economic dvelopment that assume contestable markets and thus limit 
pricing by monopolistic firms.
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kept constant in this model in order to control for the well-known effects of total 
market size on product variety, there must necessarily be an inverse relationship 
between per capita income y and population size N. Since in this model each 
consumer only purchases one unit of each variety, a smaller N  implies a smaller 
scale of production and thus higher average costs. Therefore, given aggregate 
GDP, a closed economy with high per capita income and small population size 
has higher prices of manufactured varieties in a free-entry equilibrium than a 
closed economy with large population size and low per capita income.
Using (1.5) and (1.6), the equilibrium number of varieties n as a function of 
per capita income is given by
< ( c  +  fy) ,  (1.7)u'(y -  n(c + fy))
with equality if n > 0 and strict inequality if n =  0.
Equation (1.7) provides a complete characterization of the equilibrium relation­
ship between the level of per capita income y of an economy with given aggregate 
GDP and the number n of industrial sectors in this economy. Note that existing 
general equilibrium models of monopolistic competition -  e.g. Dixit and Stiglitz 
(1977), Krugman (1979, 1980), and Judd (1985) -  cannot capture this relation­
ship, as in them the number of industrial sectors is determined solely by the 
level of aggregate GDP, independently of the level of per capita income.
To understand how the equilibrium number of varieties n is affected by changes 
in y , it is instructive to consider Figure 1.2. The P*P* line represents the profit- 
maximizing price p* as a function of per capita income y, for given number of 
varieties n, as given by (1.5).10 An increase in n makes the P*P* curve rotate 
clockwise around the origin, as it implies a lower p* for any given y in equation
10Given what has been assumed so far about u(-), it can be shown that the P*P* line must 
go through the origin and be increasing. However, as will be discussed further below, it does 
not need to be concave as shown in Figure 1.2, although this is probably the most interesting 
economic case.
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Figure 1.2: Equilibrium with a concave P*P* curve.
(1 .5). Figure 1.2 displays four different P *P * lines, for n = 0 <  ni <  <  n^ax
in clockwise order.
The straight line E E  represents instead the equilibrium average cost for any 
given level of per capita income y , as given by (1.6).
Given any level of income t/, the number of varieties n adjusts so that the 
economy reaches an equilibrium at the intersection of the P*P* and E E  curves. 
This setup can be used to perform a comparative statics exercise in order to 
analyze how n depends on y. Consider a level of per capita income y^ for which 
equilibrium is reached at point A  with a number of varieties n = n\. Assume 
now that per capita income increases from to ys- At this new level of y, if 
the number of firms n remained unchanged at ni, the profit-maximizing price 
that firms could charge for their variety would be given by point B  and would 
be higher than average cost, which is given by point B '. This opportunity for
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profits would trigger entry of new firms, which would make the P*P* curve rotate 
clockwise and the economy reach a new equilibrium at point B', with a number 
of varieties > n\. In general, for any level of y < ?/max, an increase in y causes 
an increase in p*, i.e. in the willingess of consumers to pay for a manufactured 
variety, which is greater than the induced increase in the equilibrium average 
cost, and therefore causes an increase in equilibrium product variety. Note, 
however, that for very low levels of per capita income, i.e. for y < y'0 there will 
be no industrialization, i.e. n =  0.
If instead the economy were to start at point C and per capita income increased 
from yc to ?/£>, the willingness of consumers to pay for a manufactured variety 
would now be given by point D, which is lower than the average cost given by 
point D1. Therefore the number of firms n would decrease, making the P*P* 
curve rotate anti-clockwise and the economy would reach a new equilibrium at 
point D' with ni < 712. If the P*P* curve has the shape depicted in Figure 
1.2, for any level of y > ymax> an increase in y causes an increase in p*, i.e. 
in the willingess of consumers to pay for a manufactured variety, which is less 
than the induced increase in the equilibrium average cost, and therefore causes 
a reduction in equilibrium product variety. If per capita income is extremely 
high, i.e. y > y$, and thus population size extremely small, there will be no 
industrialization, i.e. n = 0.
If the utility that consumers derive from food can be represented by then simple 
constant elasticity form u(z) =  za/a , with 0 < <7 < 1, one obtains an example 
in which the economy can be depicted as in Figure 1.2. In this case the number 
of product varieties as a function of y has the following simple expression
income y, in the case in which the P*P* curve has the concave shape shown
n = max (1.8)
Figure 1.3 represents equilibrium product variety as a function of per capita
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Figure 1.3: Number of varieties and per capita income.
in Figure 1.2. As one can see, for given total GDP, there is a non-monotonic 
relationship between per capita income and product variety. For low levels of 
y (and thus very large population size T V ), an increase in t/, and thus a de­
crease in A, increase equilibrium product variety. This is because when average 
cost is initially low, a decrease in population size does not increase it substan­
tially, whereas the ensuing increase in per capita income substantially increases 
the willingness of consumers to spend on manufactured varieties and the prices 
firms can charge for their products with it. The opposite result obtains when y 
is high (and thus population size TV is low). This result suggests therefore that, 
if the extent of domestic demand matters because international trade is very 
costly and given reasonable assumptions on the marginal utility of income, after 
controlling for total GDP one should expect countries with either very small or 
very large population size to have a smaller number of industrial varieties than 
countries with intermediate population size.
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Figure 1.4: Equilibrium with a convex P*P* curve.
However, as mentioned before, the case illustrated in Figures 1.2 and there­
fore 1.3 is not the only theoretical possibility. The P*P* curve, as drawn in 
Figure 1.2, has the property that p* does not grow too fast as y grows, which 
is the case when the marginal utility of income does not fall too fast when y 
grows. However, other situations, in which the marginal utility of income falls 
faster than average cost grows when y grows very large, are possible, although 
probably less interesting and realistic. Figure 1.4 represents one example in 
which p* grows faster than average cost when y —► oo. In this case equilibrium 
product variety is everywhere increasing in the level of per capita income. This 
theoretical possibility does not however seem to be the most realistic description 
of the world, as it would imply without exception that an economy populated by 
a single very rich person has the highest possible potential for industrialization. 
In the rest of the chapter, and especially in the next section in which I study 
the effects of income inequality on industrialization, I will therefore assume that
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u(-) is such that the economy can be represented as in Figure 1.2.
1.3.2 Incom e inequality
The analysis in the previous section can be used to derive some intuitive re­
sults on the implications of income inequality for the level of industrialization 
and the number of products introduced in closed economies at different stages 
of economic development. The most interesting lesson to be learned from such 
an analysis is that whether inequality has a positive or negative effect on in­
dustrialization depends crucially on the level of average per capita income in 
the economy. Although a much more general analysis is possible, here I will 
illustrate this important point and the intuition behind it with a very simple, 
though very special, example.
Assume that consumers axe divided into only two income classes: a certain 
share of the population is poor and, for the sake of simplicity, is assumed to 
have no income at all; whereas the remaining share of the population is rich and 
owns all of the economy’s income. Furthermore, assume that income is equally 
distributed within the upper class. Provided that total income Y  and total 
population size N  are kept constant, so is average per capita income y. I now 
analyze what happens when the size (and therefore the per capita income) of 
the upper class changes. Notice that, since in this simple example the destitute 
class has no income, the only source of demand for industrial products is the 
upper class. Increasing income inequality, which is achieved by decreasing the 
size and increasing the individual income of the upper class, has two effects: 
on the one hand it increases the willingness of each member of the upper class 
to spend on industrial products at given prices, which has a positive effect on 
industrialization, and on the other hand it deacreases the size of the customer 
base for industrial products and thus it increases their average cost and price, 
which has a negative effect on industrialization. The relative strength of these 
two effects can be gauged by looking at Figure 1.3. Given the assumption that
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the destitute class owns no income and has thus no demand for industrial va­
rieties, increasing income inequality, which corresponds here to decreasing the 
size of the upper class, is equivalent to making the relevant market for industrial 
varieties less populated and richer, an therefore to moving from left to right in 
Figure 1.3. If the economy has high average per capita income to start with 
(i.e., if y > ymax)> then increasing income inequality decreases the equilibrium 
number of product varieties. This happens because decreasing the size of the 
upper class increases average cost by more than it increases the willingness of 
its members to spend on industrial product varieties, decreasing the number of 
products that can profitably be introduced in the market. In other words, for 
rich economies, once one controls for aggregate GDP, it is high average costs of 
production, not high marginal utility of income and thus food, to hinder indus­
trialization. Therefore the level of industrialization in small and rich economies 
is maximized by perfect equality, which allows to expand the relevant market for 
industrial products as much as possible. On the contrary, if the economy is large 
and has low average per capita income (i.e., if y < ymax), increasing inequality, 
which corresponds here to decreasing the size of the upper class, has a positive 
effect on industrialization, as it is equivalent to moving from left to right in Fig­
ure 1.3. This is because this change induces an increase in the willlingess of each 
memeber of the upper class to spend on industrial varieties that is greater than 
the increase in average cost, making thus the introduction of more industrial 
varieties possible in equilibrium. In other words, for poor economies, once one 
controls for aggregate GDP, it is high marginal utility of income and thus food, 
not high average costs of production, that hinder industrialization. Therefore, 
a certain degree of inequality in poor economies can be necessary to create suf­
ficient demand for industrial products and jump-start the process of economic 
development.
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1.4 International Trade
I now use the basic framework developed in the previous section to study how 
the distribution of world income among different countries affects international 
specialization and the pattern and volume of international trade. I will limit my 
analysis to the case in which there is perfect equality within each country and 
differences in per-capita income only exist between countries.11 
Assume that the world is populated by N  individuals with an aggregate supply 
of effective units of labor equal to Y,  and thus with average per capita income 
y =  Y /N ,  and is divided into two countries, the rich North and the poor South. 
Producers in both countries have access to the same technology and to the same 
unique productive factor, labor, as described in the previous section. However, 
the two countries have different endowements of effective units of labor and 
different population sizes. In particular the South has a share a  G [0,1] of 
the total world supply of the productive factor, i.e. Ys =  otY, and a share 
f3 G [0,1] of the world population, i.e. Ns =  13N , and has therefore per capita 
income equal to ys =  (a//3)y. Analogously, the North has Yjv =  (1 — a)Y, 
Njv =  (1 — /3)N, and thus yn =  ((1 — o;)/(l — P))y. Since I assume that the 
North is richer in per capita income terms than the South, it must be the case 
that a < p .12 In this context, a//3 G [0,1] is a good measure of equality, with 
higher values indicating values of ys/yN that are closer to one.
Assume that the North and the South can trade in an integrated world mar­
ket, and that, while the numeraire good z can be traded at no cost, international 
trade of manufactured varieties is costly. In particular, I assume that, in order 
to sell its product on a foreign market, a producer has to pay a fixed cost of 
T  units of labor -  and, for future conveniency, I define r  =  T /N .  This cost
1 1  For an analysis of the effects of intra-regional inequality on the volume of trade with other 
regions, see Maurice Kugler (2001).
12Note that I am not imposing any restrictions on a  and (3 separately, and am therefore 
making no assumptions about the total market size of the two countries.
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T  might represent the cost of setting up a distribution network or of obtaining 
certification of the good in the foreign country, and it is realistic to assume that 
it does not change considerably with the volume of exports. In order to sim­
plify the analysis, I also assume that, except for this fixed market penetration 
cost, there are no shipping costs. Given the absence of shipping costs for both 
producers and consumers, arbitrage ensures that the consumer price of a given 
good is the same in both markets, implying that the trade cost T  of exporting 
a given variety is borne entirely by the producer.13
1.4.1 International equilibrium
I now construct and analyze an equilibrium in which consumers in the North 
purchase the same varieties that are purchased by consumers in the South, and 
possibly some more; where the varieties purchased by both Northern and South­
ern consumers have a lower price than those that axe purchased only by Northern 
consumers, since they are produced on a larger scale; and where the varieties 
purchased by both Northern and Southern consumers are the only varieties to 
be internationally traded.
In what follows I will assume that all consumers in the South consume the 
same varieties of the indivisible good.14 This assumption guarantees that there
13Given the particular structure of the present model, the assumption that there exists 
a positive market penetration cost that is borne by producers is crucial in order to obtain 
interesting results. To understand why, note that in the present model, given that consumers 
purchase either zero or one unit of each variety, producers could shift the entire burden of 
the shipping cost onto the consumers -  in other words, the present model is the limiting case 
of one in which the elasticity of demand tends to zero. Therefore, if shipping costs were the 
only trade costs, they would not affect at all the profits of producers and would therefore have 
no effect on their location decision, leading to an indeterminacy in the pattern and volume 
of international trade. This issue does not arise in other models of international trade or 
economic geography under monopolistic competition -  see, e.g., Krugman (1979, 1980), and 
Masahisa Fujita, Paul Krugman, and Anthony Venables (1999) -  because in those models 
consumption of each variety can, and does, adjust in response to changes in shipping costs, 
with the consequence that the burden of the trade cost is borne by both consumers and 
producers.
1 4  This assumption is not very restrictive: if one thinks that in reality goods have different 
degrees of indivisibility, then all consumers in the South would consume the same n most 
divisible goods. This would hold even if the differences in the degree of indivisibility across
38
exists a unique equilibrium of this model. Finally, I focus on equilibria in which 
neither country is completely specialized in manufacturing, i.e. in which there 
is some production of the numeraire good z in both countries and therefore in 
which the wage rate in the two countries is equalized.15 In what follows, I first 
describe the general structure of an equilibrium with international trade and 
analyze the location decision of producers; I then use the restrictions implied by 
the model to solve for the number of varieties that are traded and for the total 
volume of trade in equilibrium.
Note that, when a given variety is available on both markets, it must be sold 
at the same consumer price in every market, as the absence of any shipping cost 
for consumers allows for perfect arbitrage. Equation (1.4) implies that, when 
all consumers face the same prices, richer consumers purchase at least as many 
varieties as poor consumers do, and possibly some more.16 Therefore, since 
Vn  > Vs, if the same varieties purchased by Southern consumers were available 
in the North, they would certainly be purchased by Northern consumers. Denote 
by n the number of varieties purchased by Southern consumers and note that 
these varieties can be potentially exported to the North, since there is demand 
for them there. Since the consumer price at which each of these varieties sells is 
the same in both countries, producers of these n varieties locate in the country 
which allows them to minimize trade costs, i.e. in the larger country: if (3 > 1/2 
they locate in the South and if (3 < 1/2 they locate in the North. If trade costs 
are not prohibitively high, these n varieties will be exported form the country
goods are infinitesimally small, a case which is approximated by my model.
15This is the case if either (3 < 1/2 or (3 > 1/2 and u' ((a / (3 — 1/2)y) (c +  f y  +  r) >  1 . 
The details of the derivation of this condition are tedious and omitted here, but are available 
from the author on request. Here it is sufficient to note that, if this condition is not satisfied, 
the South completely specializes in manufacturing and thus wage equalization could break 
down. However, this is never the case if the marginal utility of food, which could be scaled 
up arbitrarily, and/or the average cost of manufactured varieties are sufficiently high, so that 
the share of the manufacturing sector in total expenditure is relatively small.
16Laurence Jackson (1984) finds strong evidence that such an Engel curve for variety is 
indeed very important in microeconomic consumption data.
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where they are produced to the other country. This is the case if the total profit 
on exports, min{/?, 1 — /?} N(pn — c), are sufficiently high to cover the fixed trade 
cost, T, i.e. if min{/3,1 — {3}(pn — c) > r . To determine the threshold level of 
the trade cost r  below which exporting is profitable, note that in a free-entry 
equilibrium the price charged by an exporting firm must be equal to its average 
cost, or
Pn =  c + f y  + r. (1.9)
Therefore a firm located in a given market exports to the other market if 
and only if
min{/?, 1 -  /?}r  < r  =  f y  • ---------------  - r ,  (1.10)maxjp, 1 — p}
whereas there will be no trade if r  > f .
Note that if (1.10) holds and the n varieties purchased by everybody in 
the world are traded, equation (1.4) implies that northern consumers might 
have some demand for an additional number m  of varieties besides the cheaper 
n varieties (depending on how high the price of these additional varieties is). 
However, since there is no demand for these varieties in the South, they would 
be produced in the North and would not be exported, becoming endogenously 
non-traded goods.17 Therefore, if r  < r , all international trade takes place in 
those n varieties for which there is demand in both countries, whereas if r  > f  
international trade breaks down. This suggests that, when two countries are 
very unequal in per capita income terms, there is very limited potential for 
trade between them, as the poor country demands very few industrial varieties, 
a result that is proved formally in the rest of this section.
As in the previous section, assume that varieties are indexed so that p{i) is 
non-decreasing in i. For a logic analogous to that in the previous section, utility
17These varieties are endogenously non-traded goods, in the sense that they are not traded 
in equilibrium even though the exogenously assumed level of trade costs r  for these varieties 
is identical to that of other varieties that are indeed traded in equilibrium.
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maximization by Southern consumers implies the following first order condition
i - i
V s -  p(i)di < p(n)0
with equality if n > 0 and with strict inequality if n =  0.
Given that > ys, Northern consumers purchase at least the n  varieties 
purchased by Southern consumers, and maximize their utility by choosing a 
number m  of additional varieties so that
with equality if m > 0 and with strict inequality if m  =  0.
In an equilibrium in which firms maximize profits it must be the case that
Furthermore, in an equilibrium with n > 0, each of the n active firms selling 
to both Northern and Southern consumers must make zero profits, which is the 
case if (1.9) holds. Analogously, in an equilibrium in which m > 0 each of the m  
active firms selling only to Northern consumers must make zero profits, which 
is the case if
■n+m
(1.12)
p(i) — p* for all i < n and p(i) = p*^  for all {i : n < i < n +  m}, such that
Pn = K (ys -  npl)} \
Pm =  K  (v n  -  n p l  -  t o j 4 ) ] -1  .
(1.13)
(1.14)
(1.15)
Using (1.9) and (1.15) in (1.13) and (1.14) one obtains
- l
< c  + f y  + r, (1.16)
- l
<c +f y / ( 3 ,  (1.17)
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where (1.16) holds with equality if n > 0 and with strict inequality otherwise, 
and (1.17) holds with equality if m > 0 and with strict inequality otherwise.
The equilibrium described by equations (1.16) and (1.17) has a simple inter­
pretation. The number n of varieties that are consumed everywhere in the world 
is determined by the level of per capita income in the poor country, as shown 
in equation (1.16). These varieties are produced in the country with the largest 
population and, for r  < f , are exported to the other country. In any case, these 
are the only varieties that are traded between the two countries. For given world 
average per capita income y and for given distribution of population between the 
two countries, (3, the per capita income of the poor country and thus the number 
n of varieties that are traded is increasing in a, the degree of equality between 
per capita income in the North and in the South. This increase in the number 
of traded varieties causes an increase in the total volume of trade between the 
two countries, as will be discussed formally in the next section. Besides the n  
varieties consumed by everybody in the world, there might be a number m  of 
other varieties that are purchased only by consumers in the North, as shown in 
equation (1.17); the equilibrium price pm of these varieties is higher than the 
equilibrium price pn of the n traded varieties, as confirmed by comparing (1.9) 
and (1.15) for r  < f , since the smaller scale at which their production takes 
place entails a higher average cost, and this higher price makes them in turn 
affordable only to Northern consumers.
1.4.2 The volum e of trade
I now compute the volume of bilateral trade, expressed as the sum of the exports 
of the two countries. Note that if (3 < 1/2, i.e. if the North is more populous 
than the South, the South imports the n varieties from the North in exchange 
for exports of good z. If instead ft > 1/2, the North imports the n  varieties from 
the South in exchange for exports of good z.
Balanced trade implies that the value of exports of the North is equal to the
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value of exports of the South, when expressed in a common numeraire. This 
allows us to write the volume of trade as twice the value in terms of good z 
of the least populous country’s imports of manufactured varieties. Since each 
consumer in this country purchases one unit of each of these n  varieties, and 
there are min{/3,1-/3} such consumers, the volume of trade, measured in terms 
of units of good z, is
V T  = 2(c +  f y  +  r) • N  • min{/3,1 — f3} • n{a)
if t < f  and zero otherwise. The notation n(a) reminds the reader that n is 
an (increasing) function of a , which is a measure of equality between North and 
South.
The total volume of trade can expressed as a share of total world GDP, Y, 
as follows
vt =  V T  =  2(c + f y  + T)
Y  y
Since n is an increasing function of a, it is straightforward to conclude that, 
for a given world distribution of population /3, the volume of trade between the 
North and the South is unambiguously increasing in a, i.e. in the similarity 
between the two countries’ per capita income.
This result is a simple formal restatement of the Linder hypothesis: when 
two countries have more similar per capita income levels, they have more similar 
demand patterns and a larger number of the goods produced in each of them 
is actually traded, implying that the volume of trade between them increases. 
Note that in the present model model an increase in the physical volume of trade 
is caused by two distinct effects, that are captured by the terms min{/3,1 -/3 }  
and n(a) in (1.18). The former effect is standard in the literature on interna­
tional trade under monopolistic competition and increasing returns: a higher 
min{/3,1 — 0} means that consumers are distributed more evenly between the
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two countries and therefore that a larger number of units in each given product 
variety actually crosses the border. The latter effect is what really captures the 
essence of the argument in the present chapter : countries with more similar 
per capita income tend to have more similar consumption bundles and a larger 
number n of varieties is actually traded between them.18
1.5 N o tes  on G ains from  Trade and W elfare
In this model, as in most models of product variety under increasing returns 
and free entry, both countries gain from trade. These gains accrue through scale 
effects in the production of the n traded varieties: when trade costs fall and 
markets become more integrated, each of these varieties can be produced at lower 
average cost and is thus sold at lower equilibrium prices, allowing consumers 
in both countries to afford and enjoy larger variety. However, countries with 
different per capita income levels do not gain from trade to the same extent in 
the present model: the country with lower per capita income gains relatively 
more than the other.19 This is due to the fact that, whereas scale effects make 
the price of all the varieties consumed in the South decrease, as all of these
18Note that the former effect, together with the assumption of costant world GDP, already 
captures all the known results on the volume of trade in the existing literature on international 
trade under increasing returns and monopolistic competition. To understand why this is an 
important observation, one should note that when a  is increased, not only the per capita 
income of the two countries becomes more similar, but also the degree of similarity of their 
aggregate income changes. Since it is known that the degree of similarity between two coun­
tries’ aggregate GDPs has an effect on the volume of their bilateral trade in existing models 
(see, e.g., Krugman, 1979 and 1980), it may seem that one could not distinguish between the 
effects on n  of changes in Y  and in y in the present model. However, this is not the case. 
In existing models, for given world GDP, the total number of varieties is given independently 
of how this aggregate world GDP is distributed between the two countries. In these models, 
the only effect of making the GDPs of two countries more similar is that more units in any 
given product variety will actually cross the border. In the present model this effect is entirely 
captured by the term min{/?, 1 — /3}. Therefore, for given P, a change in a  affects the volume 
of trade only through the effect that this has on per capita income, which in turn affects the 
number of varieties that are traded.
19This finding complements the well-known result according to which the country with 
smaller market size gains relatively more from trade, through a more dramatic increase in 
variety over what could be afforded in autarky.
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varieties are traded, the price of those varieties that are consumed only in the 
North, and that are therefore not traded, is not affected by a reduction in trade 
costs.
Furthermore, the present model also suggests that, when an inegalitarian 
economy opens to trade, different classes of consumers gain differently depend­
ing on the level of development of the trade partner. Assume that the North is 
populated by some rich and some poor consumers, and that the poor consumers 
in the North have the same level of per capita income as the consumers in the 
egalitarian South. Focusing attention on changes in consumers’ welfare in the 
North, poor consumers gain relatively more than rich consumers, since the latter 
will not enjoy a reduction in the price of some of the goods that they consume, 
while all the goods consumed by the former become cheaper. Even though the 
very special structure of the model that gives rise to this result suggests par­
ticular caution in interpreting it, this is an interesting way of reconsidering the 
distributional consequences of North-South trade. Since poor consumers in the 
North are usually associated with unskilled workers, Stolper-Samuelson effects 
make them particularly vulnerable to trade with the South. Notwithstanding 
the unresolved debate about the different causes for the increasing wage gap 
in developed countries, few would deny that such an effect could, at least in 
principle, be relevant. However, the model in this chapter suggests that, due to 
different demand behavior, the poor in the North are also those benefiting more 
as consumers from trade with the South, since the price index associated with 
their consumption bundle falls by more than that associated with the consump­
tion bundle of the rich. Turning to inequality in the South and by a symmetric 
argument, one can see that the rich in the South gains relatively more than the 
poor in the South from trade with the rich North.
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1.6 C onclusion
Economists and economic historians have long recognised that, besides the size 
of the market, also the level and the distribution of per capita income have im­
portant implications for the introduction of new industrial products, the pattern 
of international specialization and the volume of trade flows. These implications 
cannot, however, be adequately captured by the existing literature on product 
variety under increasing returns and monopolistic competition. In this chapter 
I tackled the issue using a simple model, that embeds the assumption of in­
divisible manufactured goods in an otherwise rather standard monopolistically 
competitive framework. The more realistic treatment of the demand side of the 
economy that follows from this assumption allowed me to derive what I think 
are intuitive and relevant results. Given a number of closed economies with 
similar total market size, as captured by aggregate GDP, I show that economies 
with intermediate population size and per capita income levels have a larger 
number of products than both very small and rich and very large and poor 
countries. I also show that income inequality has a positive effect on the level 
of industrialization in poor economies, whereas the level of industrialization in 
rich economies is maximized by perfect equality. These results hint at a pos­
sibly profitable application of the present model to growth theory: by clearly 
distinguishing between the effects of per capita income and of the number of 
people in the economy, my approach can help shed some light on the much de­
bated importance of population size and scale effects for the process of economic 
development.20
The model has also strong implications for explaining the pattern of in­
ternational specialization and the volume of North-South trade, and offers a 
theoretical framework within which to analyze the Linder hypothesis. When 
two countries with different levels of per capita income can trade their goods
20Charles Jones (1999) reviews current research on this topic.
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in integrated world markets at some cost, some goods may be consumed and 
produced only in the North and may become endogenously non-traded. As the 
similarity in the countries’ per capita incomes increases, so do the number of 
product varieties that are actually traded and the bilateral volume of trade.
As concerns welfare considerations, the approach taken here suggests that 
countries at different levels of development gain from trade to a different extent, 
with poorer countries gaining relatively more than richer ones. Further, trade- 
induced changes in the welfare of poor and rich consumers within an inegalitarian 
country also depend on the level of development of the trading partner: all else 
equal, consumers with personal income levels more similar to those prevailing 
in the trading partner are those who gain relatively more from trade.
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Chapter 2
Product Selection and M ass 
Consum ption in M arkets w ith  C ostly  
Search
2.1 In trodu ction
This chapter proposes an explanation for the degree of diversity in consumption 
and production observed in markets in which trade is characterized by search 
frictions and technology by economies of scale. In particular I analyze the mech­
anisms that can induce consumers with heterogeneous preferences for different 
varieties of a good or service to exhibit homogeneous consumption behaviour, a 
situation that I call mass consumption. It is worth emphasizing from the outset 
that the explanation proposed in this chapter does not rely on the existence of 
network effects, whereby the utility from consuming a given variety increases in 
the number of other individuals consuming the same variety.1 Instead I con­
struct a model in which mass consumption can emerge in equilibrium solely as a 
consequence of the existence of search frictions in the market and specialization 
in production, even if the utility functions of consumers are completely inde­
pendent. The basic idea behind the theory is intuitive. By making consumers 
less selective in their choice of the varieties that they are willing to purchase, 
search frictions reduce the sensitivity of firms’ profits to competition and thus
* 1  will discuss these and other related models in a separate section devoted to a review of 
the existing relevant literature.
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their incentives to produce niche varieties. In turn, the limited availablity of 
their preferred varieties in equilibrium justifies the choice of some consumers 
not to be selective. This idea has profound implications for product selection, 
the relationship between the size of a group of consumers and the welfare of 
its members, and the optimality of policies aimed at promoting production of 
varieties preferred by minorities. This analysis also sheds some fight on the eco­
nomic effects of the growing diffusion of the Internet and of other advances in 
telecommunication technology, by predicting the implications of a fall in search 
costs for the composition of production and the distribution of consumer welfare.
To address these issues I construct a stylized model with a certain degree 
of heterogeneity in goods and preferences, economies of scale in production, 
and a trading system characterized by random matching and costly search, as 
briefly described below. I consider the steady-state of a market in which two 
types of consumers, who constitute different proportions of the population and 
have idiosyncratic preferences for two possible varieties of a good, are randomly 
matched with producers. The non-convexity of the production technology is 
simply captured by assuming that producers, who pay a fixed cost to be in busi­
ness, have to specialize in either variety before being matched with consumers 
and can thereafter produce at constant marginal cost. I first analyze a case in 
which, upon meeting a consumer, producers can perfectly recognize her vaula- 
tion for their good, i.e. a case of perfect first-degree price discrimination. This 
rules out possible inefficiencies in pricing and therefore allows us to study the 
consequences on product selection of a single well-defined informational prob­
lem, namely costly search by consumers. The implications of imperfect price 
discrimination are addressed later in the chapter.
In selecting products, firms trade off two opposing effects on their profits: 
a customer base effect and a competition effect. Whereas, all else equal, the 
former effect induces firms to select very popular varieties, the latter effect makes
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specializing in niche varieties more profitable, since doing so allows producers to 
face less competition and charge higher prices. For very severe search frictions 
the customer base effect dominates the competition effect, with the consequence 
that all producers specialize in the most popular variety and the market is 
characterized by mass consumption. As search frictions fall, the profits of firms 
become more sensitive to competition and a larger number of them specializes 
in the niche variety. The share of the most popular variety in the total value 
of production is always larger than in a Walrasian market, where exchange is 
coordinated by a fictional auctioneer.
An interesting property of the model is that, although the matching func­
tion is characterized by constant returns2, there are strong scale effects in the 
composition of demand, in the sense that an increase in the size of a group of 
consumers causes a more-than-proportional increase in the production of the 
variety preferred by that group. This over-response of supply to changes in the 
composition of demand is the reason for the existence of consumption externali­
ties: an increase in the size of a group of consumers makes every member of the 
group better off in equilibrium, as it implies a higher probability of finding their 
preferred variety at a lower price. Finally, since a fall in search costs causes 
the share of the mainstream variety in total production to decrease, it bene­
fits consumers with minority preferences relatively more than consumers with 
mainstream preferences.
Having determined the effects of search frictions on the equilibrium, I can use 
this model to compare the market outcome with the constrained optimal alloca­
tion of production. Such an allocation would be chosen by a social planner with 
the objective of maximizing the expected steady-state utility of a consumer who 
is behind a veil of ignorance as to what her type will be and who holds a diver­
sified portfolio of shares in the profits of producers. I show that, for sufficiently
2In our setting this means that the matching speed depends only on the ratio of the number 
of producers to the number of consumers, and not on any of these numbers separately.
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severe search frictions, mass consumption, which is the unique market equilib­
rium, is constrained optimal. However, when search frictions are sufficiently 
low, the market under-provides the variety preferred by minorities compared to 
the constrained optimal composition of production. This market failure is due 
to the fact that the matching process is characterized by decreasing expected 
marginal utility in the probability of finding one’s preferred variety. This con­
sideration makes an extremely unbalanced composition of production socially 
sub-optimal, but is not adequately taken into account by producers. There­
fore the model suggests that policies aimed at encouraging production for small 
groups of consumers, e.g. medicines for rare diseases or certain types of unusual 
cultural consumption, might be justified in markets where search fricitions are 
not too severe.
After discussing the effects of costly search, I address a second informational 
problem that might have important effects on product selection, aggregate wel­
fare and its distribution between majority and minority consumers: the im­
perfect ability of producers to distinguish between heterogeneous consumers. 
Analyzing imperfect price discrimination is important here from a methodologi­
cal point of view, since it allows us to evaluate the robustness of our conclusions 
to different assumptions about pricing, and is also of interest in itself, given the 
great attention that this issue is receiving in current debates about electronic 
commerce.
Recently Amazon.com, a market leader in on-line retail of books, music and 
videos, has allegedly engaged in “dynamic pricing”, a form of first-degree price 
discrimination made possible by the technology used in many forms of electronic 
commerce.3 Dynamic pricing arises when on-line retailers can recognize the 
computer that is logging on to their system and use the history of previous 
visits to estimate the valuation of consumers for different varieties; they can then
3See Paul Krugman, “What Price Fairness?”, The New York Times, 4 October 2000.
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quote a price conditional on the identity of the consumer. In a recent article that 
discusses the possible economic effects of this practice, Paul Krugman appears 
to suggest that such price discrimination might not only be socially efficient, but 
also work in favor of people with unusual preferences, by making their preferred 
varieties more easily available on the market. However, such a conclusion is not 
always warranted when there are indivisibilities in the production technology, 
as I show by means of a simple static version of our random matching model 
where producers endogenously choose the specification of their product. In this 
model an increase in the ability of producers to price discriminate may cause 
a shift in the composition of production towards the tastes of the majority. In 
particular, this is likely when the sizes of the two groups of consumers are not 
too different. In such a case, when firms are unable to price discriminate they 
choose a “middling” specification of their product, that appeals equally to both 
consumer types, and charge a unique price. However, when price discrimination 
becomes a profitable option, they maximize profits by choosing the product 
specification preferred by the majority, that they sell at different prices to all 
consumer types in the market. This shift in product selection, together with the 
fact that matching is random, implies that an increase in the ability of sellers to 
price discriminate can redistribute surplus away from consumers with minority 
preferences and towards consumers with mainstream preferences.
The rest of the chapter is organized in six sections. Section 2 .2  briefly dis­
cusses how my work relates to the existing relevant literature. Section 2.3 de­
scribes the structure of the model, defines the search equilibrium and discusses 
the Walrasian allocation of this economy. In section 2.4, I solve a simplified 
version of the model where there is no substitutability in consumption between 
varieties as a means of introducing the basic mechanisms. Section 2.5 discusses 
the general case with substitutability between varieties and shows how mass con­
sumption can emerge in equilibrium. Section 2.6 addresses the issue of imperfect
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price discrimination. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 R ela ted  literature
The issue of product selection in market economies has a long tradition in eco­
nomics. In his account of the cultural and social consequences of modern mass 
production in the United States, Tibor Scitovsky (1976) expressed concerns 
that the presence of strong economies of scale in production and marketing 
would induce producers to choose products that appeal to the tastes of large 
groups of consumers and thus to discriminate against consumers with unusual 
tastes, unless the latter are sufficiently rich to afford to pay a very high price 
for their preferred variety. Though convincing, Scitovski’s analysis does not 
propose a benchmark against which to evaluate how well the market fares in 
providing variety, given the fact that the production technology of many goods 
is characterised by increasing returns to scale. The task of constructing such a 
benchmark and of systematically studying the direction of the biases in product 
selection is undertaken in a classic article by Michael Spence (1976). Spence 
shows that a monopolistically competitive market tends to under-provide the 
products preferred by small groups of consumers with low elasticity of demand 
compared to the optimum .4 One aspect of the problem that is not discussed by 
either Scitovsky or Spence is the fact that markets for differentiated goods are 
characterized by non-negligible search costs that consumers and producers have 
to bear to locate one another. In this chapter I illustrate that this fact has a 
number of important implications for actual and optimal product selection and 
for the relative welfare of majority consumers and minority consumers.
Many of the results obtained in this chapter also arise in models where trade 
is frictionless but there is a technical or social network component to consump­
4  He also shows that allowing producers to price discriminate can eliminate this inefficiency, 
a result that will become relevant for the analysis in section 2.6 of this chapter, in which I 
discuss the effects of price discrimination on product selection.
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tion activities (see, e.g., Michael Katz and Carl Shapiro (1985), Joseph Farrell 
and Garth Saloner (1985), Edi Karni and David Schmeidler (1990), and Gary 
Becker (1991)). However, the mechanisms behind the results of my model and 
those of the models mentioned above fire very different, making them suited 
for the analysis of different types of goods and industries. In models with net­
work externalities, the reason that a given variety or brand captures a very 
large share of the market is that utility functions display complementarity in 
consumers’ decisions: the utility from a certain consumption choice increases as 
more consumers make the same choice. In my model consumers’ utility func­
tions are completely independent and the magnification effect, with the ensuing 
consumption externalities, arises endogenously as a consequence of the trading 
mechanism. Models with network externalities are particularly suited to analyse 
the consumption of goods such as VCRs, computer software and hardware, and 
to some extent other forms of social consumption like restaurant services, f i lm s  
and fashionable clothes. In contrast, my model seems to be more appropriate for 
other kinds of consumption in which the technical or social interdependence of 
people’s choices is less evident but search costs are important, such as medicines, 
books or other differentiated and specialised goods or services.
Mass, or herd, behavior in the choice among different alternatives can also 
emerge because of informational cascades, as in Abhijit Banerjee (1992) and 
Sushil Bikhchandani et al. (1992). In those models, that assume identical 
preferences, agents may decide to overlook their noisy private signal about the 
payoffs of different alternatives and join the herd with the conviction that widely 
held behaviours reveal information about the best alternative. This mechanism 
does not operate in this chapter, since in my model consumers have perfect 
information about their preferences and the types of the good in the market, 
but do not know where to locate them.
Although the practical issues addressed are different, the mechanism operat­
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ing in this chapter closely resembles that underlying recent developments in the 
literature on wage inequality in labour markets with costly search.5 In partic­
ular, Daron Acemoglu (1996, 1998, 1999) and Stephen Machin and Alan Man­
ning (1997) show that, as a consequence of imperfect information and matching 
frictions, an increase in the supply of a particular type of labor leads to a more- 
than-proportional increase in the number of firms using a technology designed 
for that particular type of labor. Similarly, in the model presented in this chapter 
changes in the composition of the demand base cause more-than-proportional 
changes in the composition of supply.
Recent work by Robert Shimer and Lones Smith (2000a, 2000b) also studies 
markets with costly search and heterogeneous agents. However, their work is 
concerned with cases of vertical heterogeneity, where everybody agrees on who 
makes a better match than others, whereas this chapter deals with a case of hor­
izontal differentiation, where agents have idiosyncratic preferences over different 
alternatives.
Finally, this chapter is obviously related to the literature on search in product 
markets.6
2.3 S tructure o f th e  m odel
Consider a market for a differentiated durable good that comes in two possible 
varieties, denoted by j  = 1,2. Time is continuous and trade takes place be­
tween two distinct groups of risk neutral agents, consumers and producers, who 
discount the future at the common rate r  > 0 .
5See Christopher Pissarides (2000) for a comprehensive treatment of the search approach 
to the study of labor economics.
6See Joseph Stiglitz (1989) for a survey and further references.
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2.3.1 Consumers and preferences
At any moment in time there is a unit measure of consumers, a share a  > 1 / 2  
of whom is of type 1 (the majority consumers) with the rest being of type 2  
(the minority consumers). Independently of her type a consumer only needs 
one unit of the good. If she is of type i and buys one unit of variety j  at a 
price pij, she derives flow utility Uij — pij, where Ua = 1 and Uij =  u < 1 for 
* 7^  hJ — 1>2. Upon purchasing one unit of the good the consumer leaves 
the market and another consumer of the same type is bom, so that both the 
total number of consumers and the shares of the two types in the market remain 
constant over time.7
2.3.2 Producers and technology
On the other side of the market, there is a large number of potential producers 
who can purchase one of an exogenously given number M  of sites at a price 7  and 
open their shop.8 The market for production sites is perfectly competitive and 
the price 7  of a site is therefore given by the net present value of an active firm. 
After having purchased their site, but before being matched with customers, 
producers can produce one, and only one, unit of either variety of the good 
at zero marginal cost. This assumption of complete specialization is meant to 
capture the importance of scale economies in many of the markets in which I am 
interested. I denote by (f> the shaxe of active producers that decide to specialize in 
variety 1 , and by <f> the share of variety 1 in the total value of market production. 
After producers have decided in which variety to specialize, trade takes place 
according to the decentralized mechanism described in the next section. When 
a producer of type j  eventually sells its good, it can also sell its production site
7This “cloning assumption” is very convenient in simplifying the algebra but does not affect 
the qualitative results of the model.
8The conveniency of this modelling choice, introduced by Daron Acemoglu (1999), will 
become apparent below when I compare the Walrasian equilibrium to the search equilibrium.
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to a new producer and leave the market receiving an amount equal to pj +  7 . 9
2.3.3 Random matching and the determ ination o f prices
At any moment in time each consumer is matched with at most one randomly 
drawn producer with probability given by a Poisson process with arrival rate 
a = a(M ) . 10 When a consumer and a producer meet, they immediately recog­
nize each other’s type (i.e., the consumer recognizes the variety carried by the 
producer and the producer recognizes the buyer’s type) and they have to decide 
whether to trade or not. I discuss the reasons for assuming here that producers 
have perfect information as regards the types of the consumers with which they 
are matched -  which amounts to perfect first-degree price discrimination -  at 
the beginning of section 2 .6 , which analyzes the implications of relaxing this 
assumption. Let Vi denote the steady-state lifetime expected utility of an un­
matched consumer of type i and Rj denote the steady-state value of a producer 
who has already purchased a site and specialized in variety j . 11 The equilibrium 
probability that a consumer of type i and a producer with good j  conclude an 
exchange, conditional on the fact that they met, is denoted by Xij. If they de­
cide to trade, I assume that they do so at a price determined by the (possibly
9The results of the model would be unchanged if producers were infinitely lived and could 
therefore produce more than one unit of the good. However, here I assume that producers leave 
the market after selling one unit of their product to maintain a certain degree of symmetry 
between producer and consumers.
10Note that this implies constant returns to scale of the matching function, since the rate 
at which matches take place depends only on the ratio of the number of the two types of 
agents searching. Given the cloning assumption made above, that implies that the numbers of 
producers and consumers actively searching are not determined by the model, this property 
of the matching function is immaterial for the rest of our analysis, and it would not have 
important effects on our main results even without the cloning assumption. However, I want 
to emphasise here the property of constant returns of the matching function, because I will 
show below that the model displays strong scale effects in the composition of demand, that 
do not depend on increasing returns at the aggregate level. Furthermore notice also that, 
since in any equilibrium with positive matching frictions all M  sites are used, each producer 
is matched with a consumer at the rate a / M .
1 1  Note that in equilibrium the steady state value of an active producer will be equal to the 
price of a site, i.e. R j  = 7 , and therefore the net expected value of a producer considering 
entry in the market is equal to zero.
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asymmetric) Nash bargaining solution, with the producer receiving a share A 
of the surplus that the match creates over and above the sum of the expected 
continuation utilities of the two parties. If they do not trade, they continue 
searching for another partner. 12
2.3.4 Equilibrium w ith costly search
Given the structure outlined above, an equilibrium in this market can be defined 
as follows:
A steady-state search equilibrium is a tuple {(f)*,  ^ that satisfies:
1 . Optimal product choice by firms: Ri(<f>*) =  # 2(0 *) if <t>* £ (0» 1)» R\ > R 2 
if (f>* =  1 , and R 2 > Ri if (f>* =  0 .
2. Probabilities of agreement Xij consistent with Nash-bargaining for all i and 
j : = 1 if ui:} > Vi(</>*)+Rj(</>*)-7 * , x^ = 0 if < Vi((f>*)+Rj((f>*)-7 *,
and x ^  e  [0, 1] if u{j =  Vi(</>*) +  Rj(4>*) -  7 *.
3. Free entry: R j(</>*) = 7 * if firm j  is active.
2.3.5 The Walrasian allocation
Before proceeding to analyze the equilibrium with search frictions, it is instruc­
tive to briefly discuss what the Walrasian allocation of this economy would be 
if trade were frictionless. The Walrasian allocation consitutes a natural bench­
mark against which to evaluate the effects of search frictions on the equilibrium 
composition of production throughout the rest of the chapter. 13 In the Wal­
12See Martin Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein (1990) for a detailed analysis of the bargaining 
approach to the determination of prices in decentralized markets.
13Notice that I do not intend to attach any normative meaning to this comparison. Com­
paring the search equilibrium to the Walrasian equilibrium gives a positive prediction on the 
effects of search frictions on the composition of production. For normative purposes, one 
should consider constrained efficiency, which involves comparisons of environments character­
ized by the same level of search frictons. I study constrained efficiency in sections 2.4.2 and 
2.5.2 below.
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rasian equilibrium the price of both varieties equals (zero) marginal cost, and 
since profits are zero so is the price of sites 7 . 14 Upon being born, every con­
sumer of any type immediately finds and purchases her most preferred variety, 
obtaining utility equal to one. Finally, the share of variety 1 in the value of total 
production, is equal to the share of type 1 consumers in the population, a , 
since every consumer buys one unit of her most preferred variety. I will show 
below that, once trade is characterised by costly search, the market outcome 
systematically departs from the Walrasian allocation and, in particular, always 
displays <£>* > a = $ w .
2.4 T h e sim ple case w ith  no su b stitu ta b ility
In this section I solve and analyze the model in the simple case in which con­
sumers do not attach any value to their least preferred variety, i.e. in which 
u =  0. One should notice from the outset that this assumption does not allow 
me to discuss mass consumption in a strict sense, since under no conditions 
a consumer will ever decide to purchase her least preferred variety instead of 
continuing to search for her most preferred variety. Nevertheless, this simple 
version of the model has the merit of clearly introducing the basic mechanisms 
that bias the equilibrium of markets with costly search in favor of the varieties 
preferred by large groups of consumers, and also allows ume to carry out in a 
rather simple way some interesting, though preliminary, welfare analysis.
2.4.1 Equilibrium with search frictions
Notice that assuming u =  0 implies that in equilibrium consumers always reject 
their least preferred variety and always accept their most preferred variety as 
soon as they find it. Although in equilibrium consumers always purchase their 
preferred variety, the price that they pay for it crucially depends on their reser­
14Notice that 7  =  0  implies constant returns to scale in the producers’ production function, 
which in turn implies that there exists a Walrasian equilibrium of this market.
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vation utility in the bargaining with producers, i.e. on their expected utility if 
they decide to remain unmatched. This steady-state level of expected utility 
depends on the probability that type i finds her preferred variety, a<j) for type 1 
and a(l — 0 ) for type 2 , on the cost of waiting r, and on the surplus (1 —pa) that 
she obtains when this happens. Formally, Vi must satisfy the following Bellman 
equations
rVi =  a 0 ( l - P i - V i ) ,  
rV2 = a( 1 -  0 ) ( 1  -  p2 -  V2),
where I have used the fact that in equilibrium xa =  1 and x{j = 0, for i ^  j ,  and 
simplified notation by writing pa = pi. The interpretation of these equations is 
standard. One can think of Vj as the asset value of search for an unmatched 
consumer of type i: she can decide to either retain the option to search and 
obtain an instantaneous utility flow of rVi, or, if given the opportunity to do so, 
which happens with probability a0  for type 1 and a (l — 0 ) for type 2 , relinquish 
it and obtain a capital gain of (1 — pt- — Vi). Given the optimal stationary decision 
rule Xa =  1 and = 0 , the reservation utility for consumer i is that value of 
Vi that leaves her indifferent between these two alternatives. Rearranging and 
defining m = a/r, one obtains
m 0
( 2 1 )
Throughout the chapter I will use m  as a measure of the speed of matching in 
the economy. 15 The assumption about the sharing of surplus between consumers
15Notice that I can do this because the expected lifetime utility Vi is homogeneous of de­
gree zero in a and r, a very natural property since equal proportional changes in these two 
parameters only involve a rescaling of time.
VM)  =
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and producers implies
pi(<fi) = \ [ l - V i(<j>)- & ( $ )  + 7 }, i = 1 , 2 . (2 .2 )
Substituting (2.1) into (2.2), and taking into account that free entry implies 
=  7 , one obtains prices as functions of the share of producers specializing 
in the two varieties
ra(l  -  A)</> +  1 ^
P2^  =  m (l — A)(l — 0) +  1'
The price pj is decreasing in the share of producers specializing in variety j ,  
because an increase in the latter raises the reservation utility of a type j  consumer 
and therefore lowers the price that she is willing to pay for her preferred variety.
The steady-state value Rj of a producer that has already purchased a site 
and specialized in variety j  is given by
rR 1 =  (a/M )a{p1 +  7  -  tfi), 
tR 2 =  (a/M )( 1 -  a){p2 +  7  ~  # 2),
which, taking into account the free entry condition Rj = 7  and substituting
(2.3) for pi and p2, can be written as
M  m (l — A)0 +  1 ’ £2 4 )
7? (a \ -  mX l ~ a
2W  M  m (l — A)(l — 0) +  1 ’
By using part 1 (optimal product choice) of the definition of equilibrium, 
which implies that Ri((j)*) =  R 2 (<f>*) if both varieties are produced and R\ >  R 2 
if only variety 1 is produced, one can find a unique closed form expression for 
the share of producers specializing in variety 1
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^ ' =  m in{“  + ^ d o ’1}' (25)
The solid line in Figure 2.1 depicts <j>* for all m.  When m < f h =  — l)
the equilibrium has (fi* = 1 and minority preferences go completely uncatered 
for. For m >  fh there is positive production of variety 2 in the market, and the 
share of firms specializing in this variety increases as matching improves.
Ai
Figure 2.1: Share of type 1 producers for u = 0.
The intuition behind this result has to do with the interplay between a cus­
tomer base effect and a competition effect. The customer base effect is obvious: 
for given 0, and thus given prices, an increase in the number of consumers of 
type i makes specializing in variety i more profitable, as it increases the expected 
volume of sales. Note that the strength of this effect does not depend on the 
level of matching frictions in the economy.16 The competition effect operates
16This is because of the cloning assumption. If this were removed and a more general 
specification were adopted where the two types of consumers are born at the exogenously 
given rates a  and ( 1  — a) at every moment in time, and die at an exogenously given rate, then 
the steady state number of the two types of customers would depend on the different rates at
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through prices, and crucially depends on m  and </>. For given m, an increase in 
(j) lowers the price of variety 1 and raises that of variety 2 , as can be seen from
(2.3), which makes specializing in variety 2 more profitable. Notice that, in an 
equilibrium with </>* <  1, it must be the case that Pi(<l>*)/P2(<i>*) = Qf/(1 — a). 
Since p i ( c t ) / p 2 ( a )  > a / ( l  — a) and, as discussed above, the price of variety 1 
relative to that of variety 2  is decreasing in 0 , in equilibrium it must be 0 * > a.
The interplay between these two effects also explains the comparative statics 
of the model with respect to changes in m. Competition is extremely weak for 
very imperfect matching (note that if m  —► 0 in (2.3) prices do not depend on 
(j> at all). This is why for m  < in the customer base effect dominates and all 
producers in the market specialize in the majority variety. When m  grows larger, 
so does the sensitivity of producers’ profits to competition and a larger number 
of them finds it convenient to switch to the niche variety, i.e. variety 2 . Notice 
also that, for all m, <f>* is increasing in the bargaining power of the producer, 
A. As A —> 1 one has that (j>* =  1 for all m. This is not surprising, since for 
A —► 1 the model converges to one where the producer cannot commit ex-ante 
to leave any surplus to the consumer and the Diamond (1971) result applies: 
every producer is in a monopolistic position and the competition effect does not 
operate. Therefore allowing the producer to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to 
the consumer would only work in the direction of making mass consumption 
more likely in equilibrium.
Given </>*, one can derive the share of variety 1 in the value of total production, 
evaluated at market prices, and compare it to that of the Walrasian environment. 
The fact that x{i = 1 and Xij =  0 for i ^  j  implies that
which they leave the market, that in turns depend on the level of matching frictions in the 
market. However, the solution to this more complex model, which I do not include here but 
which I can make available on request, shows that the results of the present simplified model 
hold also in that more general case.
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$* =   =  6*  (2 .6)
ap\(j>* +  (1 — a)P2(l — $*)
where the last equality follows from the fact that in any equilibrium with </>* < 1 , 
and thus with equal profits from specializing in either variety, the relative price 
of the two goods must be p\)p\ =  (1 — a)/a . Note that, for all m, > a  = $ w . 
This shows that in a market with costly search the market share of the varieties 
preferred by large groups of consumers is always larger than in the Walrasian 
allocation. This result depends crucially on the existence of search frictions in 
the economy, as is demonstrated by the fact that the equilibrium share of variety 
1 in the value of production converges to the Walrasian one when these frictions 
vanish, as can be seen by letting m —» oo in (2.5).
Although the assumed matching process is characterized by constant returns 
to scale, the equilibrium of the market studied in this model exhibits strong 
scale effects in the composition of the demand base, since an increase in the size 
of a given group of consumers causes a more-than-proportional increase in the 
production of the variety preferred by the members of that group. This can be 
seen by using (2.5) and (2.6) to derive the elasticity of 4>* with respect to a
V =  1 + m ( l - \ ) p > 1  (2'7)
Once again, it is easy to check that the existence of scale effects depends 
crucially on search being costly, as 77 —► 1 when m  —> 0 0 . This result bears a 
striking resemblance to what in the international trade literature is known as 
“home market effect” (Krugman, 1980): in the presence of economies of scale in 
production and trade frictions between countries, an increase in the demand for 
some variety causes a more-than-proportional increase in the production of that 
variety, a mechanism that leads to the variety being exported by the country 
that produces it. However, whereas in the international trade literature the
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source of trade frictions is a physical transport cost for exchanges taking place 
under perfect information, here it is the presence of imperfect information and 
a less than perfect matching process between consumers and producers.
Finally, the welfare of each group of consumers in equilibrium can be analyzed 
by using (2 .1 ) and (2 .2 ) to obtain
y ,  =  m (l -
1 m( 1 -  A)0 * + 1 ’ /n q\
m( 1 -  A)(l -  P )
2 m (l -  A)(l -  tj>m) +  1'
Since </>* > 1 / 2 , i have V{ > V2 for all m < oo: consumers belonging to the 
majority group axe better off than consumers belonging to the minority group 
because they are more likely to find their preferred variety and because, when 
they do, they have to pay a lower price for it. Note that, for given m, (2.5) 
and (2 .8 ) imply that V{ is increasing and V2 decreasing in a: this model gives 
rise to consumption externalities, in that an increase in the size of a group of 
consumers makes its members better off and the members of the other group 
worse off. This is not the case in the Walrasian allocation, where consumers’ 
welfare is independent of the relative size of the group to which they belong.17
Magnification effects and consumption externalities as those just described 
above arise also in models where there is a technical or social network component 
to consumption activities (see, e.g., Katz and Shapiro (1985), Farrell and Saloner 
(1985) and Becker (1991)). However, as discussed in section 2.2, the mechanisms 
that cause these effects and externalities in the present model are very different 
from those at work in those models and resemble more closely those at work in 
Acemoglu (1996,1998,1999) and Machin and Manning (1997).
17If one were to specify a general equilibrium model of production, where production of 
the two varieties uses two inelastically supplied factors with different intensities, then in a 
Walrasian market a consumer would actually be made worse off by an increase in the size of 
her group, because this would have the consequence of raising the equilibrium relative price 
of her most preferred variety. This relative cost effect would still operate also in our market 
with search frictions, but if 77 is large enough, which happens for low m  or high A, a consumer 
still benefits from an expansion in the size of her group.
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Finally, improvements in the matching technology benefit consumers in a 
minority relatively more than consumers in a majority, as V2 /V\ is increasing 
in m  for m > m, and V2 /V*  —► 1 as m  —► oo. This means that the recent 
growth of the Internet might benefit consumers with minority preferences more 
than the large majority of consumers with mainstream preferences. The early 
diffusion pattern of the Internet may offer some indirect support for this thesis: 
the first private users of the Internet were people with very unusual interests 
who were willing to pay what at the time was a non-negligible cost to reduce 
their search costs. This seems to suggest that they derived a relatively larger 
benefit than people with mainstream interests from a reduction in search costs.
2.4.2 Welfare
The previous section has shown that, when consumers know their type, they 
would have contrasting interests if they were allowed to choose 0 , since any 
change that makes one group better off necessairly damages the other. The 
question that I ask in this section is: what is the composition of production that 
would be chosen by a consumer who is behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ as to whether 
she will be of type 1 or of type 2  and who holds a diversified portfolio of shares in 
the profits of producers? In other words, I am interested in the informationally 
constrained optimal composition of production that maximizes the expected 
steady-state welfare of a representative unborn generation. I focus on a situation 
in which a social planner that can choose (j) is subject to the same informational 
problems as the other agents in the market. In particular, this means that 
after the planner has chosen the optimal </>p , consumers and producers are still 
matched in a completely random way.18 Since Nash bargaining implies that all 
mutually profitable exchanges are effected and no inefficiency arises after a given
18The optimal composition of production </>pcan, for example, be implemented by devising 
an adequate system of subsidies to production without interfering with the exchange between 
producers and consumers.
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match has occured, the planner does not have to take any further action after 
having chosen the optimal (f)p . Therefore the planner chooses (f)p as to solve
max W(4>) =  aVi +  (1 -  a)V2 +  M  [4>R\ +  (1 -  4>)R?\, (2.9)
0€[O,l]
where V* and Rj axe functions of 0 as given by (2.8) and (2.4), respectively. If
one defines g = a / ( 1  — a), the solution to this problem is
(2 1 0 )
The share of variety 1 in the total value of production, evaluated at market 
prices, that is implied by the planner’s optimal specialisation choice19
* *  = ________ ________ = ______ ' M . ____  (2 1 1 )
flrfV, + r f ( i - * p) Jgp + i l - w  [ ’
where the second equality follows from the fact that for (j)p as given by (2 .1 1 ) 
the relative price of the two varieties is pp/p f  =  yfg.
By comparing (2.5) to (2.10) one sees that (j>* = <j)p = 1 (and 4>* = 4>p = 1 ) 
for m < fhp =  ^ ~ 1-, and <j>* > (f)p  ( and > 4>p > a) for rrt > fhp. The 
comparison between the equilibrium and the optimal composition of production 
is illustrated in Figure 2.1 where the solid line depicts 4>* and the dashed line 
depicts 4>p .
It can be seen that, for m  < rhp, the market outcome, =  1, is optimal: 
search costs are too high relative to the number of type 2  consumers for positive 
production of variety 2 to employ the M  sites efficiently.20
19Note that prices are still well defined, as the planner does not interfere with the exchange 
process but only chooses production subsidies or taxes to influence 0 .
20Notice that if the social planner were only concerned with maximizing the rate of produc­
tion he would choose <f>= 1. This can be seen from the fact that the number of total matches 
at any moment in time is at(J> +  (1 — a )( l — 0), which is clearly maximised at 0  =  1  since 
a  >  1 / 2 .
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However, for m  > fhp, the market tends to systematically under-provide 
variety 2 compared to the optimal composition of production. This inefficiency 
arises from the fact that V\ is concave in m(f) and V2 is concave in m (l — </>), as 
revealed by inspection of (2.8). In other words, the search process specified in 
this model is characterized by decreasing marginal utility in the the probability 
of finding one’s preferred variety.21 This implies that, given the probabilities a 
and (1 — a) of being born as type 1 or 2 , respectively, an individual behind a veil 
of ignorance would prefer to face a not very extreme composition of the market 
production. The market equilibrium fails to deliver the optimal composition of 
production because producers do not take into account consumer surplus when 
selecting products. To see this, notice that if A —► 1, then <f>p —><!>*—> 1 : the 
social planner and market outcome coincide, as both maximize the value of sites 
(i.e. the aggregate level of profits in the economy), and consumers are indifferent 
as to the composition of production, since they never obtain any surplus.
2.5 S u b stitu tab ility  and m ass consum ption
Although the previous section unveiled some of the basic mechanisms that oper­
ate in the model introduced in section 2.3, assuming u = 0 makes it impossible 
to study the conditions that determine the emergence of mass consumption pat­
terns where consumers with different preferences all end up consuming the same 
variety. In this section I solve and analyze the general version of the model with 
u > 0  and discuss under what conditions mass consumption is the equilibrium 
outcome in a market with trade frictions. I then compare the market equilib­
rium with the constrained optimal composition of production chosen by a social
21This property is complementary to that, first noticed by Stigler (1961), that, for given 
sample composition, there is decreasing marginal utility to the number of searches made by a 
consumer. Notice that the fact that in my model there is decreasing marginal utility to the 
composition of the urn in one’s favour does not depend crucially on my assuming sequential 
search: similar results would obtain if consumers were sampling simultaneously a share k  < 1  
of the M  producers and purchase with equal probability from all those that guarantee them 
equal surplus.
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planner.
2.5.1 Equilibrium w ith search frictions
When u > 0, consumers are faced with a non-trivial economic choice every time 
they happen to be matched with a producer carrying their least preferred vari­
ety: they may decide to buy it and leave the market or not to buy it, remain in 
the market and continue searching until they find their most preferred variety. 
The outcome of this decision depends on the speed of search, m, and on the 
equilibrium probability with which a consumer finds either variety, (f> for variety 
1 and (1 — (f) for variety 2. In deciding which product to specialize in, produc­
ers anticipate the acceptance rules adopted by consumers, and since the latter 
depend on the severity of search frictions, so does the equilibrium composition 
of production. I show below that, in the presence of costly search, variety 1 
always has a larger market share than in the Walrasian equilibrium. In fight 
of the results obtained in section 2.4, this is not surprising, as mass consump­
tion becomes only more likely when varieties are to some extent substitutable 
in consumers’ utility functions.
If consumers adopt optimal steady-state acceptance rules s, as defined 
in part 2  of the definition of equilibrium, their expected lifetime utilities, V*, 
corresponding to the asset value of search, must satisfy
rVi =  a(j>xn ( l  - p n  -  Vi) +  a (l -  <f>)x12(u -  p12 -  Vi),
(2 .12)
rV2 = a<j)x2l(u -  p21 -  V2) +  a( 1 -  <j))x22(1 -  p22 -  V2).
Given Xij((f>) and Vi(<f>), the surplus of any match is shared between the parties 
so that
P iM )  =  A \uij ~  v i{<t>)\ > for h 3  =  1,2; (2.13)
where I have already made use of the fact that in a free entry equilibrium Rj = 7
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-  see equation (2.2). Note that the premium that a consumer is willing to pay 
to obtain her most preferred variety over the price that she is willing to pay for 
her least preferred variety, pa — =  A(1 — u), is independent of m, a result
that greatly simplifies the rest of our analysis.
Taking as given the x^-’s and p^-’s determined by (2.12), (2.13) and part 2 
of the definition of equilibrium, active producers optimally select the variety in 
which to specialize as illustrated in part 1 of the definition of equilibrium. The 
steady-state value Rj((f>) of a producer specializing in variety j  is
where I have already made use of the fact that in a free entry equilibrium Rj =  7 . 
To simplify notation in what follows, I define rhi < fh2 as
P roposition  1  For any given m, a, and u there exists a unique equilibrium. 
In any equilibrium x u  =  1 ; X12 =  0, and
(i) i f 0 < m < fh i ,  then X21 =  1 and </>* =  !.
T f l
# 2(0 ) =  “  [axn (4>)p1 2(<f>) +  (1 -  a) x 2 2 (4>)pY/,(<i>)\;
(2.14)
— 1 and m2 = 11 — A .1 — u
The following proposition characterizes completely the set of equilibria.
(ii) if mi < m < m 2 , then X21 = 1, x22 =  1, and <jf =  ^jL < \  -
Proof. In the Appendix.
The results of Proposition 1 are illustrated in Figure 2.2, that depicts the 
equilibrium share of producers specializing in variety 1 for all levels of matching
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t a = ° )
Figure 2.2: Share of type 1 producers for u > 0.
speed m. It can be seen that for very high search costs, i.e. for m  <  mi, 
mass consumption is the only possible equilibrium outcome: only variety 1 is 
introduced in the market and it is purchased also by type 2 consumers. The 
intuition behind this result is that, when matching is extremely costly, consumers 
cannot afford to be very selective and a producer is likely to sell to anybody 
showing up at his door; anticipating this, producers tend to choose the variety 
for which they are more likely to charge a high price, i.e. variety 1 . Since type 
2 consumers know that their preferred variety is extremely unlikely to be found 
in the market, they are willing to accept and pay a rather high price for variety 
1 . On the contrary, given the wide availability of their preferred variety, type 1 
consumers would accept variety 2 only at such a low price that its production is 
not attractive to any potential producer. When search costs fall and one reaches 
the interval rh\ < m < m2 , the market goes through a transition phase in which 
some producers begin to specialize in variety 2 and sell only to the minority
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consumers, who still accept the mainstream variety 1 when they find it (i.e. 
X21 =  1 for 7711 < m < ra2). Finally, when m  > m2 no consumer ever accepts 
her least preferred variety and the analysis of section 2.4 applies.
The equilibrium share of variety 1 in the total value of production is given
by
t . (gPn +  *2i V2 1 W
(gp'n +  XnP2i)4>" +p52(1 -  4>'Y
where I have made use of the result that in any equilibrium i n  =  1, X12 = 0, and 
x 2 2 =  1 whenever (1 — (ft) > 0. It is easy to prove that, for all m, 4>* > a  =  $ w 
and that 7 7  > 1 , which implies that both the scale effects and consumption 
externalities discussed in the previous section are still present.
2.5.2 Welfare
When u > 0 a complete characterization of optimal product selection and a 
comparison to the market outcome is more complex than in the case where u =  0 . 
In general, when consumers can easily substitute between the two varieties, the 
bias of the market allocation against the niche variety becomes weaker, and for 
certain intermediate levels of search costs the market may even provide too much 
of it. However, it can be shown that this situation is not very likely and that, 
when search frictions are sufficiently weak, a situation similat to that of the 
previous section occurs, in which the market always under-provides the varieties 
preferred by minorities.
A planner would still choose (ft to maximize (2.9) without interfering with the 
exchange process, since Nash bargaining implements all efficient transactions. 
However, in contrast to section 2.4.2, he now has to take into account the effects 
of his choice of (ft on the equilibrium x ^ s .  A detailed solution to the planner’s 
problem is extremely complex and is available on request; here I discuss the main 
results and intuitions. It can be proven that it is never optimal for a planner to
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choose 0  =  0  or a 0  such that consumers of type 1 accept their least preferred 
variety, i.e. at any social optimum 0 > 0 and £12 =  0. The planner is therefore 
left with a choice between 0 = 1  and 0  < 1 , and in the latter case it has to 
decide whether a 0 such that £21 =  1 or such that £21 =  0 is optimal. Note that 
these are the same possible configurations as in the market equilibrium, with the 
only difference that whereas the transitional phase with £21 =  1 always exists in 
a market equilibrium, a planner might find it convenient not to implement such 
a solution.
One can show that when search frictions axe either sufficiently high or suf­
ficiently low, the conclusions of section 2.4.2 still apply. When search frictions 
are sufficiently high mass consumption is the constrained optimal way to employ 
scarce productive resources and the market ‘does the right thing’. When search 
frictions are sufficiently low, the market tends to under-provide the varieties 
preferred by small groups of consumers. This owes to the same reasons as in 
section 2.4: when search frictions are low, consumers tend to be very selective 
and, given random matching, the expected lifetime utility of any given consumer 
type is concave in the probability of finding her preferred variety, which gives the 
central planner scope for increasing expected steady-state welfare by increasing 
the equilibrium utility of minority types.
However, for intermediate levels of search costs the planner might find it 
convenient to choose a 0 that implies £21 =  1. For example, this always happens 
for intermediate levels of m  if the size of the two groups is not very different or 
the two varieties are not very differentiated, i.e. if y/g(y/g — 1) < u. If this is 
the case, then the market under-provides variety 1. The reason for this result 
is that, when minority consumers accept both varieties, their expected utility 
becomes linear in 0 , whereas the utility of type 1 consumers, who are selective, 
is still concave in 0. It turns out that this allows the social planner to increase 
social welfare by increasing 0  over and above the market equilibrium.
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2.6 Im perfect price d iscrim ination
So fax I have considered situations where the producer is always able to recognise 
the type of the consumer with certainty and charge different prices if profitable, 
which amounts to allowing for perfect first-degree price discrimination, since a 
producer always extracts all the surplus that he can (given his bargaining power 
A) from every consumer type. Assuming perfect information on the seller’s side 
had two advantages: it simplified the analysis and it allowed me to study the 
effects of a single well-defined informational problem, namely costly search by 
consumers. However, in markets where consumers have heterogeneous prefer­
ences for a differentiated good this is not the only relevant informational prob­
lem, as the imperfect ability of producers to discern the different valuations of 
heterogeneous consumers for their good may also have important consequences 
for market outcomes. In this section I study the implications of an increase 
in such ability for product selection, social welfare, and the realtive welfare of 
majority and minority consumers.22
In contrast to the dynamic setting of sections 2.4 and 2.5, and in order to 
keep the analysis tractable, in this section I use a simple static model of random 
matching in which producers have to choose from a continuum of possible prod­
uct specifications before being randomly matched with a consumer. Upon being 
matched a producer observes a characteristic of the consumer that he knows to 
be imperfectly correlated with the consumer’s type, after which he charges a 
price that the consumer can accept or reject, and the game ends. I study how 
equilibrium product selection, social welfare, and its distribution are affected by 
changes in the correlation between the observable characteristic and the true
22The effects of price discrimination in a monopolistic competition model of random match­
ing are also analysed by Michael Katz (1984). However, he focuses on a situation where 
consumers have different valuations for a single homogeneous good produced by firms with 
U-shaped average cost curves. Consequently, his analysis does not address product selection 
and is rather concerned with efficiency in production and in the allocation of the good to 
consumers with different demand elasticities.
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type of the consumer. I take this correlation to be a good measure of the ability 
of producers to correctly price discriminate. Although other more general spec­
ifications are possible, this model captures in a simple way most of the aspects 
of the problem that are of interest.23
As in the previous sections there is a unit measure of consumers, with a share 
a  > 1 / 2  of them being of type 1 and the rest of type 2 , and g =  a /(  1 — a). 
Each consumer desires to consume only one unit of the good. A good consists 
of a combination of two measurable attributes, with 9 € [0,1] representing the 
share of attribute 1 and 1  — 9 that of attribute 2 in the composition of the good, 
so that a variety can be identified with a number 9 e  [0,1]. The two types of 
consumers have idiosyncratic and symmetric preferences over the two attributes, 
with type Ts satisfaction increasing in 6 . In particular, I consider the simple 
case with linear utility:
Ui =  u + 0  — p,
(2.16)
U2 =  u  +  1  — 6 — p
where u > 0 . 24
On the other side of the market there is a unit measure of producers who, be­
fore being matched with a consumer, have to decide irreversibly in which variety 
9 to specialize. After producers have specialized, they are randomly matched in
23In particular, the model could be generalized in two directions. First, in this simple static 
model there is no competition among producers. A dynamic model that captures the effects 
of competition on product selection would obviously be more desirable, though much more 
complex. However, I am confident that the main conclusions of this section would still hold 
in such a general framework. Second, the ability of producers to price discriminate could 
be modelled in a different way: whereas here producers always observe the characteristic of 
the consumer but know that this does not perfectly predict her true type, another possible 
specification would have perfect correlation between the buyer’s characteristic and her true 
type, but the producer being able to observe this characteristic only with some probability that 
is less than one. The solution to this alternative model yields the same qualitative conclusions 
as the model that I use here. However, the model that I use here allows for a more interesting 
analysis, because producers can decide endogenously when to price discriminate or not.
24Assuming linear utility simplifies the analysis substantially because, as I show in Lemma 
3 below, it implies that in equilibrium the support of 9 is discrete and can take one of only 
two possible values. Allowing for utility functions that are non-linear in 9 would not change 
the main conclusions of this section but would make the algebra much more cumbersome.
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one-to-one pairs with consumers. When a producer and a consumer meet, the 
producer observes a characteristic s G {1 ,2} of the consumer. A consumer of 
type i has characteristic i with probability w G [1/2,1]: if 7r =  1/2 the char­
acteristic is completely uninformative, whereas if 7r =  1 the producer gets to 
know with certainty the type of the consumer. After observing characteristic s, 
with probability A a producer carrying product 9 has the opportunity to quote a 
price p(9, s) that the consumer can accept, in which case exchange takes place, 
or reject, in which case no exchange takes place. With probability (1 — A) it is 
the consumer who has the opportunity to make the offer. After offers have been 
accepted or rejected the market closes. In this framework ir is a good measure of 
the ability of producers to price discriminate between heterogeneous consumers.
In order to simplify the analysis of the equilibrium, I first establish the fol­
lowing lemmas.
Lem m a 2 A producer with product 6  always charges p{9, s) G {u-f 9, u + 1 — 9}. 
Proof. In the Appendix.
This has the following implication for product selection by producers:
Lem m a 3 In equilibrium 9 G {1 /2 ,1 }.
Proof In the Appendix.
The intuition behind these two lemmas is straightforward. Lemma 2 says 
that producers do not want to leave any surplus to the marginal group of con­
sumers that they have chosen to target. If a producer with variety 9 decides 
to sell to everybody he charges min{u +  9, u +  1 — 9}, otherwise he charges 
max{u +  0, it + 1  — 9} and sells only to high valuation consumers. Lemma 3 says 
that, if producers decide to sell only to one type of consumers, it will be type 1 , 
the most numerous group, and they will choose the product specification that
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best suits this type, i.e. 0 =  1 . If instead they decide to sell to both types, then 
they will choose the product specification that maximises unit profit margins, 
and, given the symmetry of the problem, this is that specification that makes 
both types equally happy, i.e. 0 = 1 / 2 .
One can now use these results to determine the equilibrium for any configu­
ration of parameters. I start by analysing the pricing stage, taking 0 G {1/2,1} 
as given. Notice that if 9 =  1/2 then p (l/2 ,s) =  u +  1/2 irrespective of the 
signal s that the producer observes. Therefore, denoting by R(9) the expected 
revenues of a producer with variety 0, one obtains R( 1/2) =  1/2. The pricing 
problem becomes more interesting for a producer that has chosen 0  =  1 , as he 
may or may not decide to make the price that he charges, p(l, s) G {it +  l,u} 
conditional on the consumer’s characteristic s that he observes. The decision to 
price discriminate or not depends on the overall informativeness of the observed 
characteristic, 7r, on the relative size of the two groups, <7, and on the minimum 
valuation for the good, it, as shown in the following lemma.
Lem m a 4 In any equilibrium:
XL(i) p (l, 1) =  it +  1 if and only i f  'K > ------ =  7fi, otherwise p( 1,1) =  it.u + g
(ii) p( 1 , 2 ) =  it if and only if  ir > —- — = 712, otherwise p( 1 , 2 ) =  it +  1 .
u + g
Proof In the Appendix.
Lemma 4 says that, for given 7r, a producer is more likely to trust characteris­
tic s, and thus make the price charged conditional on its particular realization, if 
consumers of type s constitute a large share of the population, because if group 
s is large signal s is more reliable. This can be seen from the fact that as the 
share of consumers of type 1 , and thus g, increases, the threshold of 7r above 
which a producer decides to charge p ( l ,l)  =  it + l, that is 7Ti, decreases. Anal­
ogously 7T2 decreases as the share of type 1 consumers, and thus <7, decreases.
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It should also be noted that if u —» oo then p(9, s) = u for all 9 and s . This is 
because when u is very large making mistakes is costly for the producer: moving 
from a price u to a price u+  1 would give him a marginal gain of at most 1 but 
at the risk of losing all the large inframarginal gain u. This suggest that price 
discrimination is less likely in markets where the good has a very high value for 
the consumer and is not perceived to be too differentiated. The descriprion of 
the equilibrium is completed by optimal product choice and is presented in the 
following proposition.
Proposition 5
(i) For g >  2u +  1: 0 =  1 for all 7r; if  7r < #2  then p(l, s) =  u +  1 for all s; if
7r > 7f2 p{ 1 , 1 ) =  u +  1 and p( 1 , 2 ) =  u.
(ii) For g < 2u +  1: i f  ir < n then 6  = 1/2 and p (l/2 ,s ) =  u -f 1/2 for
all s; if ir > it then 9 = 1 , p ( l ,l)  =  u +  1, and p (l,2 ) =  u; where
7f =  (2u +  g +  l) /2 (u 4- g).
Proof In the Appendix.
This proposition provides some interesting insights regarding the effects of an 
increase in the ability to price discriminate on product selection, social welfare, 
and the relative welfare of the two groups of consumers, which will now be 
discussed in turn.
As regards product selection, when consumers of type 1 constitute a very 
large share of the population, all producers chose 0 =  1, whatever the scope for 
price discrimination. When the difference in size between the two groups is not 
too large, however, a substantial increase in the scope for price discrimination 
causes producers to shift from 9 = 1/2 to 0 =  1. This happens because without 
price discrimination producers do not want to risk the relatively large number 
of type 2 consumers, and therefore choose the “middling” specification 9 = 1/2
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that they sell to everybody. However, with price discrimination producers can 
switch to the extreme specifcation 6  = 1 , lose no demand, and increase their 
expected profits.
As regards social welfare, I can show that it is increasing in ir and that with 
perfect price discrimination the market outcome is constrained efficient. This 
is due to the fact that, as discussed in Spence (1976), when the scope for price 
discrimination increases, social surplus corresponds more closely to firms’ profits, 
and the latter are maximized in equilibrium. Note that, in contrast to section 
2.5, where any exchange generating positive surplus was carried out, imperfect 
price discrimination leads to inefficiencies in pricing and some exchanges with 
social value may not be effected. Given our assumption of linear expected utility, 
this is the only inefficiency in this simple static model, since the distribution of 
surplus among consumers does not matter.25 By removing this inefficiency, price 
discrimination achieves constrained efficiency.
Finally, the model sheds some light on the implications of an increase in the 
producers’ ability to price discriminate for the distribution of surplus between 
majority and minority consumers. When the disproportion in the size of the two 
groups is very large, i.e. when g > 2 u +  1 , an increase in n  above 7r2 does not 
cause any change in the composition of production, since the equilibrium already 
has 0  =  1 , but it induces producers to price disciminate, by offering the good 
at the low price u when they observe s = 2. This implies that, whereas type 1 
consumers always purchase, and if they are lucky enough to be mistaken for type 
2  consumers they obtain some positive surplus, type 2  consumers only purchase 
if the producer correctly distingushes their type, and even in that case they pay 
a price exactly equal to their valuation. Formally, using (2.16) and Proposition
25Notice how this differs from the model analyzed in sections 2.4 and 2.5, in which there was 
no inefficiency in pricing, but the market equilibrium was not constrained optimal because the 
dynamic structure of the model implied that the lifetime utility of individuals was concave in 
the probability of finding their preferred variety. If one were to set the present model in a 
dynamic framework, this inefficiency would be added to the pricing inefficiency.
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0Figure 2.3: Welfare of type 1 and type 2 consumers for g > 2u +  1 .
5, the expected utility of the two groups of consumers when g > (2u + 1) is
U\ =  (1 — A ) ( u  +  1) +  A i i ( l  — 7r),
(2.17)
U2 =  (1 — A )u ,
where i\ is an indicator variable that equals 0 if 7r < ^2 and 1 otherwise.26 Figure 
2.3 depicts the evolution of the welfare of the two types of consumers when the 
producers’ ability to price discriminate increases for the case where g > (2u+ 1).
One can see that any 7r E ( ^ j l )  makes type 1 strictly better off than she is 
when 7r < 7f2- Type 2’s welfare is not affected by changes in ir.
An increase in 7r has even more extreme consequences for the welfare of the 
two types of consumers when the size of the two groups is not very different or 
when consumers have a very high basic valuation for the good, independently of 
its variety, i.e. when g < (2u+l). In this case when 7r is low, all producers choose
26The terms (1 — X)(u +  1) and (1 — A)u are due to the fact that the consumer can make 
the offer with probability (1 — A), in which case he offers a price equal to zero, the offer is 
accepted by the producer and he obtains all the surplus generated by the exchange.
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9 =  1/2. However, when n grows above n  it becomes convenient for producers 
to choose the extreme specification 9 = 1  and price discriminate. As already 
noted above, this means that type 1 consumers alaways purchase and obtain 
a bargain with probability (1 — 7r), whereas type 2 consumers only purchase if 
they are charged u and in that case they are left with no surplus. Formally
Ui =
Uo =
(1 — A)(t t+ l /2)  if 7T < 7f
(1 — X)(u +  1) +  A(1 — 7r) otherwise,
(1 — A )(u + l /2 )  if 7T <  7f
(1 — A)w otherwise.
(2.18)
Figure 2.4 represents U\ and C/2 as a function of 7r for the case where g < 
(2u + 1). One can see that an increase in 7r above n causes an increase in the the
0
Figure 2.4: Welfare of type 1 and type 2 consumers for g < 2u +  1. 
expected utility of type 1 and, provided that A < 1, a decrease in the expected
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utility of type 2. The changes in the utility of the two consumer types are more 
dramatic here than when g > (2u + 1), because here they depend not only on 
the possibility that, owing to imperfect discrimination, type 1 consumers obtain 
a bargain, but also on the shift in production from 9 = 1/2 to 0 — 1. Notice 
that, provided that A < 1 , type 1 consumers are better off under perfect price 
discrimination than under no discrimination at all.
Although the analysis presented here confirms that allowing for price dis­
crimination achieves constrained efficiency, it does not confirm the intuition, 
suggested for example by Paul Krugman,27 that allowing for price discrimina­
tion works in favour of diversified production and in particular of people with 
peculiar preferences. The reasoning behind this intuition is that if producers 
were able to distinguish the high valuation of minority consumers for a given 
variety, the small number of the latter would be less of a serious problem, as 
revenues might be sufficiently large for the good to be introduced in equilib­
rium. However, the cogency of this reasoning is substantially weakened when 
consumers can substitute to some extent between different varieties and pro­
ducers have incentives to specialize in production. In this case, the possibility 
of price discrimination can make it more profitable for producers to choose a 
variety for which many consumers have a high valuation, and to sell that same 
variety also to everybody else in the market at lower prices, than to specialize 
in a niche variety, that would be sold at a high price to few people and at a low 
price to many people.
2.7 C onclusions
This chapter has presented a simple model of a market for a differentiated good 
where consumers with idiosyncratic preferences constitute different shares of the 
population and trade is characterized by costly search. The model shows that
27 Op. c i t see page 52.
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the existence of search frictions biases the market outcome in favor of consumers 
with the same preferences as the majority. In particular, for any positive level of 
search frictions the equilibrium market share of the variety preferred by the ma­
jority is always greater than in the frictionless Walrasian case. If search frictions 
are sufficiently severe a situation of mass consumption can emerge, in which only 
the mainstream variety is produced and purchased by everybody. Although there 
are no increasing returns in the matching process, the model generates scale ef­
fects in the composition of the demand base: an increase in the size of a group of 
consumers with the same preferences leads to a more-than-proportional increase 
in the production of their preferred variety. This has the effect of benefiting the 
members of the group that expands, and reducing the welfare of the members of 
the group that contracts, giving rise to consumption externalities. This bias of 
the market outcome in favour of the majority becomes weaker when search fric­
tions decrease: the model suggests that the diffusion of the Internet should allow 
the emergence of markets for specialized goods, redistribute market shares away 
from top-selling varieties and towards niche varieties,28 and ultimately bene­
fit consumers with peculiar preferences relatively more than consumers with 
mainstream preferences. The model also allows a comparison between the mar­
ket equilibrium and the constrained optimal composition of production. When 
search frictions are sufficiently severe, the market ‘does the right thing’, in that 
mass consumption is constrained optimal. However, when search frictions are 
sufficiently low, the market tends to under-provide the variety preferred by the 
minority relative to the constrained optimum. This is because producers do not
28Since Sherwin Rosen’s (1981) analysis of ‘The economics of superstars’, an expansion in 
the size of the market in the presence of indivisibilities in production and of some degree 
of non-rivalry in consumption is associated with an increase in the concentration of market 
shares on a few performers or product varieties. According to this line of reasoning, one could 
think that the Internet, by increasing matching possibilities and therefore the potential size of 
the market, might accentuate the tendency of some markets to exhibit ‘superstardom’ effects. 
However, the theory developed in this chapter suggests that, if the diffusion of the Internet 
will also substantially reduce search costs, one might observe a rather different outcome where 
market shares will be more evenly distributed among performers or product varieties.
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adequately capture the negative effects of an extremely unbalanced composition 
of production on expected steady-state consumer surplus.
I then use a simpler and slightly modified version of this model to investi­
gate the consequences of a second informational problem, namely the imperfect 
ability of sellers to price discriminate. Social welfare is increasing in the sellers’ 
ability to price discriminate. Furthermore, if the two groups of consumers do not 
differ too much in size, an improvement in the sellers’ ability to price discrimi­
nate causes a shift in product selection towards the preferences of the majority. 
This change in the composition of production, together with the existence of 
costly search, redistributes surplus from minority consumers to majority con­
sumers. This result is strengthened by the fact that, when price discrimination 
is imperfect, bargains become possible and this can be obtained only by majority 
consumers.
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A p pend ix
P ro o f of P roposition  1 . I first derive some conditions that an equilibrium 
must satisfy. This helps to rule out those configurations that cannot constitute 
an equilibrium. I then derive the equilibrium by construction and easily establish 
that it is unique for any given parameter configuration.
Note first that X u  —  1 whenever the preferred variety of consumer type i is 
available on the market, i.e. Xn =  1 whenever </> > 0  and x 22 = 1 whenever 
<j) < I. The proof is trivial: assume that Xu = 0, then (2.12) implies that 
Vi < u < 1 , which, by part 2  of the definition of equilibrium, contradicts the 
initial assumption that Xu =  0.
Next I establish that <f) =  0 cannot be an equilibrium. If (j> =  0, then 
X22 =  £12 =  1> and (2-14) implies that the value of a firm specializing in good 2 
is # 2(0 ) =  opi2(0) +  (1 — a)p2 2 (0). The value of a firm specializing in good 1 is: 
if m (l — A) (1 — u) > u then x2i =  0 and i?i(0) =  apii(0), that can be proved to 
be strictly greater than # 2(0 ); if instead m (l — A)(l — u) < u  then x2i =  1 and 
Ri(0) = apn(0) +  (1 — a)p2i(0), that is obviously strictly greater than # 2 (0 ). 
I have therefore proven that <j> =  0 does not satisfy part 1 of the definition of 
equilibrium, since for all m  we have Ri(0) > R2(0).
I next prove that (j> < 1 and X\ 2 =  1 cannot be an equilibrium. If X\ 2 =  
x2i =  1 then (2.14) implies Ri -  R 2 = a(pn — P2 1) ~  (1 -  a)(P22 — P2 1) = 
(2 a — 1)A(1 — u) > 0, where the second equality follows from (2.13). If instead 
X \ 2 = 1 and x2i = 0 then it can be proved that for 0 such that R\(4>) =  R 2 (4>) 
part 2 of the definition of equilibrium implies that it cannot be x2\ = 0, since 
V2 (4>) < u , which contradicts the initial assumption.
Therefore any candidate equilibrium must fall in one of the following config­
urations: (i ) (j> = 1 , (ii) 0  < (f> < 1 and £21 =  1, (Hi) 0  < <j> < 1 and x2i = 0 . I 
show below that each of these configurations is an equilibrium on some interval 
of m  and that these intervals never overlap, so that the equilibrium is always
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unique, (i) (j> = 1 is an equilibrium if /?i(l) > ^ 2(1 ), which is the case if and 
only if m < rh\. (i i) 0  < <f) < 1 and £2i =  1 is an equilibrium if R\(<t>) =  # 2(^)5  
Vi(<f>) > u, V2 ((f)) < u, and obviously (f> < 1. Simple algebra shows that the 
first equality implies that (f> = fh i/m ; at this value of </> the constraint V\ > u is 
always satisfied and the constraint V2 < u is satisfied if and only if m  < m2; this 
together with the requirement that 0  < 1 implies that this equilibrium exists 
if and only if fhi < (j> < m2 . (Hi) 0  < <j> < 1 and £21 =  0  is an equilibrium 
if the same constraints as in (ii) are satisfied with the exception that it must 
now be V2 ((f>) > u. It can be shown that the only potentially binding constraint 
is V2 ((j>) > u , that is satisfied if and only if m > m2. It is apparent that the 
intervals of m  on which these equilibria are defined are connected, which proves 
that there always exists an equilibrium and this equilibrium is unique. Q.E.D.
P roo f of Lem m a 2. First, consider a producer with product 6  =  1/2. If 
he charges p ( l /2 , s) > u +  1 / 2  he has zero demand, and therefore deviating to 
any price less than or equal to u +  1/2 is optimal. If he charges p (l/2 ,s ) < 
it +  1 / 2  there exists some e > 0  such that he can increase his profits by 
charging p (l/2 ,s) +  e. Therefore the only possible equilibrium for 0 = 1/2 
is p ( l /2 , s) = u +  1 / 2 . Consider then a producer with product 0° 1 / 2 .
If he charges p(0°,s) > max{u +  0°,u +  1 — 0°} he has zero demand, there­
fore charging any price that is less than or equal to max{u +  0 °, u +  1 — 0 °} 
is a profitable deviation. If he charges p(0°,s) < min{u +  0°,u +  1 — 0°} 
he sells to both types; therefore there exists some e > 0  such that charging 
p(0°,s) +  e, is a profitable deviation. Finally, if he charges p(0°,s) such that 
min{u +  0 o,w-l- 1 —0 °} < p(0 °,s) < max{u-[-0 o,u + l  — 0°}, then he only sells to 
the group of consumers with the lowest \i — 0°|, in which case there exists some 
e > 0  such that by charging p(0 °, s) +  e he looses no demand and increases prof­
its, which constitues a profitable deviation. This proves that in any equilibrium
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it must be p(0, s) G {u +  6, u +  1 — 6). Q.E.D.
P roof of Lemma 3. Consider a producer who has chosen 6 °  such that 1/2 <  
0° < 1. Lemma 2 implies that he will charge p(0°, s) 6  {u + 0°,u+  1 — 0°}. If 
he charges u +  0 ° he sells only to type 1 consumers, therefore there exists some 
e > 0  such that the producer can increase its profits by choosing 0  =  0 ° -f- e 
and thus 0° is not an optimal product selection. If he charges u +  1 — 0° he 
sells to both types of consumers, therefore there exists some e > 0  such that 
the producer can increase his profits by choosing 0 ° — e and again 0 ° is not an 
optimal product selection. An analogous argument can be used to prove that 0° 
such that 0 < 0° < 1 / 2  is not an equilibrium. So far we have established that 
in any equilibrium 0 G {0,1/2,1}. It remains to be proved that 0 =  0 is not an 
equilibrium. We do so by showing that 0 =  1/2 or 0 = 1 are always optimal de­
viations. If for a producer with 0 =  0 charging u and selling to everybody is the 
optimal pricing strategy, then choosing product 0  =  1 / 2 , charging u +  1 / 2  and 
selling to everybody is a more profitable product selection strategy. If instead 
charging u +  1 and selling only to type 2  is the optimal pricing strategy, then 
choosing product 0  =  1 , charging u +  1 and selling only to type 1 consumers 
achieves higher expected profits, as type 1 consumers are more likely to meet 
than type 2 consumers. This proves that 0 =  0 cannot be an optimal product 
choice and completes the proof. Q.E.D.
P roo f of Lem m a 4. Denote by Prob(t =  i|s =  j) , with i , j  =  1 , 2 , the 
probability that a consumer is of type t — i when he has characteristic s =  j. 
Using Bayes’ rule, we have that
girProb(£ =  l\s =  1) =  
Prob(£ =  2 |s =  2 ) =
gn+  (1 -  7r)
7T
7T + g(l -  7r)'
Then (i) follows from the fact that p(l, 1) =  u - 1- 1 if and only if Prob(t =
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l |s  =  1 ) x (u +  1) > u, and (ii) from the fact that p( 1 , 2 ) =  u if and only if 
u > Prob(t =  2|s =  2) x (u +  1) > u. Q.E.D.
Proof o f Proposition 5. Assume g > 2 u -f 1 . Since g > u, Lemma 4 (i) 
implies that p(l, 1) =  u +  1 for all ir G [1/2,1]. Furthermore, if 7r < 7f2 then 
Lemma 4 (ii) implies that p(l,2) =  u +  1 , thus 6  = 1 if and only if i?(l) =  
a(u + 1 )  > u +  1/2 =  R( 1/2), which is always satisfied for g > 2u +  1. If 
instead 7r > 7f2 then Lemma 4 (ii) implies p(l,2) =  u and 6 = 1 if and only if 
R( 1) =  7Ta(u  +  1) +  [o(l — 7r) +  (1 — a)7r]u > u +  1/2 =  R( 1 / 2 ), that is always 
satisfied for 7r > 7t2 and g > 2u + 1. This proves the first part of the proposition. 
Assume then that g < 2u + l. If u < g < 2 u +  1 then arguments analogous to 
those above establish that 0  = 1 if and only if 7r and 0 — 1 / 2  otherwise. 
If instead g < u then Lemma 4 (ii) implies that p(l,2) =  u for all n  G [1 / 2 , 1]. 
Furthermore, if 7r < 7fi then Lemma 4 (i) implies that p(l, 1) =  u and thus 
0  = 1 / 2  if and only if -R(l/2 ) =  u +  1 / 2  > u =  .R(l), which is always the case. 
If instead 7T > 7Ti then Lemma 4 (i) implies that p ( l , l ) = u + l  and thus 6  = 1 
if and only if R( 1) =  na(u  +  1) +  [a(l — 7r) +  (1 — a)n]u > u +  1/2 =  R( 1/2), 
that is satisfied for ir > 7f. This completes the proof. Q.E.D.
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Chapter 3
Globalization and Cultural Diversity: 
The Econom ics of the “Cultured 
E xception”
3.1 In trod uction
Among the many heated debates about the consequences of the increasing glob­
alization of the world economy, that focusing on its implications for cultural 
diversity surely occupies a prominent place in every day conversations and press 
commentaries. The terms of the debate can be summarized as follows. Many 
commentators, especially outside the United States, argue that, as a conse­
quence of increasing economic integration, most national markets for cultural 
goods, such as films, TV shows, books, and music have come to be dominated 
by products that are typical of the culture of the world’s largest national market, 
namely the United States. Looking at available data for the film industry, it is 
impossible to deny the truth of this argument. Judith Prowda (1997) reports 
that, at the beginning of the 1990s, “the United States commanded a staggering 
85% of the world’s film market, and 90% of the European film market. Of the 
100 most attended movies in the world in 1993, eighty-eight were American. 
By contrast, only 2 % of the films released in the United States are of European 
origin The conclusion that some European commentators draw is that this 
state of things is necessarily bad for consumers outside the United States and 
that therefore other countries should be allowed to protect their culture and,
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with it, their cultural industries.1 Although these calls for the protection of a 
country’s culture from the consequences of possible market failures may have 
some merit, the arguments used to support them are often based more on a Eu­
ropean intellectual tradition of suspicion towards American culture rather than 
on sound and impartial logic. In particular these arguments fail to consider one 
crucial element: if so many Europeans are willing to pay for watching American 
movies, they must derive at least some utility from them. Therefore an expan­
sion of American productions is not necessarily welfare reducing. Furthermore, 
it would be difficult for an impartial observer not to suspect that the true aim 
of the French film industry could be to influence the public opinion in order to 
gather support for a protectionist campaign. In this chapter I show that an ar­
gument can indeed made in support of a limited degree of protection of national 
cultural industries in small, but not too small, countries. In doing so, however, 
I also expose several weak links in the logic of the advocates of the principle of 
cultural protecionism at all costs.
Before proceeding with the presentation of the model that underlies my anal­
ysis, it is useful to give a brief account of the recent history of the European 
film industry and of his commercial relations with the United States. In 1989 
the debate about globalization and cultural diversity moved from the press and 
other intelectual circles to the policy arena when the European Union passed 
the “Television without Frontiers” directive, which required at least 50% of the 
programs broadcast over European television to be of European origin. In fact, 
the directive allows individual countries to impose higher quotas, and France 
has increased this minimum share to 60%, besides imposing an 1 1 % surcharge 
on all box office receipts and videocassette sales, the revenues of which are re­
distributed only to French producers. American film producers have opposed 
very strong resistance to these discriminatory policies, and in 1993 have asked
1 See, for example, Thomas Bishop (1997).
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that they be lifted as part of the GATT protocol on trade liberalization. The 
European Union, mainly on behalf of France, refused to concede on this point, 
and after a row that risked jeopardizing the entire round of trade talks, the issue 
remained unresolved and the provisions of the “Television without Frontiers” di­
rective are still in place today. France’s argument in defense of its position is 
that audio-visual productions are different from other products usually traded 
in markets, as they constitute an important part of French culture, and that 
therefore trade protection is necessary as a means of avoiding that increasing 
globalization jeopardizes cultural diversity. Hence the principle of “cultural ex­
ception” , on the basis of which France claims the right to protect its audio-visual 
industry from foreign competition. The fierce row caused by this principle is not 
surprising if one considers the stakes involved: the film industry is the second 
most important export sector for the United States, after commercial aerospace, 
and raised foreign revenues of 9.4 billion dollars in 1994, of which 4.7 billion 
dollars accrued from European sales alone.
The purpose of this chapter is to use standard economic analysis to shed some 
light on the main issues in this often confused debate, and, after having done 
so, to evaluate the merits or flaws of the conclusions drawn and of the remedies 
proposed by the advocates of trade protection as a means to preserve cultural 
diversity in the face of globalization. In order to do so, I first propose a simple 
operational definition of what it means for a product to be typical of the culture 
of a country. I assume that, although consumers in a given country value variety 
in itself and derive utility from many different products, they derive more utility 
from a certain set of products than from others: the products in this set are those 
typical of this country’s culture. This definition implies that, all else equal, 
consumers in a given country have a preference for varieties which are typical of 
their country’s culture over varities which are typical of other countries’ culture, 
and are therefore made worse off by market forces leading to the predominance of
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the latter and the progressive disappearance of the former, as claimed by many 
commentators. However, they also imply that consumers in a given country are 
willing to substitute away from the former and towards the latter, a feature which 
is necessary and crucial for the predominance of the culture of large countries 
to occur but which is often neglected by commentators. Once the possibility 
of substitution between goods of different cultures is appropriately taken into 
account, the implications of economic integration for the welfare of consumers 
in small countries are not as clear-cut, and not necessarily as negative, as some 
commentators argue. On this simple operational definition of cultural goods, 
I build a model of international trade which allows me to address in turn the 
following three questions.
The first step must obviously be a positive analysis of the issue. In partic­
ular one needs to establish whether and especially how an increase in economic 
integration, in the form of a decrease in real trade costs, can lead to the pre­
dominance in world markets of products that are typical of the culture of large 
countries and to the possible disappearance of products that are typical of the 
culture of small countries in the absence of government intervention. I show 
below that this outcome is a natural consequence of the “home market effect” 
(Krugman, 1980), which arises when goods are produced under increasing re­
turns to scale in monopolistically competitive markets, a setting which describes 
pretty well the kind of industries which are the focus of this chapter. In plain 
words, the home market effect states that, in the presence of trade costs, a coun­
try which has a large market for a given product variety (perhaps because it has 
a large number of consumers with a strong preference for this variety) will be a 
net exporter of that variety. This implies that a large country as the USA will 
export a large amount of its cultural productions and will therefore command 
a very large share of the world market in these industries. Furthermore, in the 
particular version of the model that I adopt in this chapter, in which the cultural
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industry does not employ all the economy’s labor, as it co-exists with another 
numeraire sector, and can therefore expand or contract, the home market effect 
and the predominance of the products of the large country in world markets 
become more important as trade costs fall.2 In the extreme case in which the 
small country is sufficiently small and trade costs are sufficiently low, the cul­
tural industry of the small country can be completely swept away by economic 
integration.
Second, does the fact that economic integration decreases provision of the 
varieties preferred by the consumers in the small country necessarily implies that 
the latter are made worse off? The answer to this question is obviously no, since 
a fall in real trade costs also implies an increase in the resources that consumers 
have available for purchase of cultural varities, which clearly has a positive effect 
on their welfare. Given the particular structure of my model I can in fact derive 
the stronger result that the latter positive effect always dominates the former 
negative effect and consumers in the small country are always made better off 
by a fall in real trade costs.
Finally, can the small country benefit from a trade regime that allows it 
to impose tariffs, or other protective measures, on imported cultural varieties? 
The answer to this question is yes, provided that the country is not too small. 
Note that trade protection, just as real trade costs, influences the composition 
of cultural production in favor of the small country, but its effects on the do­
mestic consumers’ disposable income and on the optimality of the allocation of 
consumption differ from those of real transport costs. Contrary to an increase 
in real transport costs, the imposition of tariffs, provided that tariff revenues are 
entirely redistributed, does not affect the consumers’ disposable income. How­
ever, the imposition of an import tariff introduces a wedge between the relative 
prices of imported and domestic varieties and their true relative social costs,
2I will discuss towards the end of this introduction the main differences between the home 
market effect as it operates in the present model and as it operates in Krugman (1980).
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which leads to a potentially important consumption distortion. Therefore, by 
levying a tariff on imported varieties a country can increase the production of 
varieties typical of the domestic culture at the cost of introducing a consumption 
distortion at the margin. If the country is not-too-small, the tariff needed to 
achieve the first objective is not too high, and its benefits can offset the small 
social costs of the consumption distortion that it causes. However, if a country is 
very small, the tariff needed to achieve the first purpose would be vey high, im­
plying a very strong consumption distortion and making free trade optimal. The 
importance of country size in determining the optimal solution to this trade-off, 
which will be made more precise in the rest of the chapter, can explain why a 
policy of cultural protectionism can make sense for a relatively large country 
like France, but would be detrimental for small countries like Sweden, Denmark, 
Norway, and the Netherlands, that have historically chosen to completely open 
their television, film, and book markets to American and English products.
The remainder of this chapter is in five sections. Section 3.2 gives a brief 
account of related literature. Section 3.3 sets out the model and Section 3.4 
presents its solution in the case in which there are real transport costs and no 
government intervention. Section 3.5 analyzes trade protection. Section 3.6 
concludes.
3.2 R ela ted  L iterature
In this section I briefly clarify how the model presented in this chapter relates 
to the existing literature. The setting of my model is standard in the inter­
national trade literature and is very closely related to Krugman (1980), from 
which, however, it differs in on important respect. Krugman’s model has a 
unique monopolistically competitive sector, in which the quantity produced by 
each single active firm, and thus the indirect labor demand of each single firm, 
depends only on the elasticity of demand and on technology, and is independent
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of transport costs. Pull employment of labor implies therefore that the number 
of varieties produced in each country is completely independent of the level of 
transport costs. A change in transport costs has the only effect of determining 
changes in the real wages of the two countries. In my model, the monopolisti­
cally competitive sector co-exists with a perfectly competitive sector producing 
under constant returns to scale. This implies that the monopolistically com­
petitive sector in each country, and the number of varieties produced therein, 
can expand or contract in response to changes in transport costs; whereas the 
real wage in each country, at least when computed in terms of the numeraire 
good, is independent of transport costs. The latter seems to be a more appro­
priate framework to study the issues at hand, as I am interested on the effects 
of globalization on the composition of cultural production and as the level of 
employment in the cultural industries under consideration is unlikely to have 
major effects on national wages. A second advantage of the setup adopted in 
this chapter is that it assumes away the well-known effects of tariffs on the terms 
of trade and allows me therefore to focus exclusively on a different mechanism 
through which a limited degree of trade protection can improve the welfare of a 
country.
The normative analysis in this chapter, and especially the determination of 
the optimal tariff, is also related to Venables (1982), who studies the optimal 
trade policy for a country with an import-competing monopolistically competi­
tive industry. However, whereas Venables considers a small country and remains 
agnostic on the way in which trade policy in this country affects the number of 
foreign varieties, I consider a general equilibrium model of the world economy in 
which the composition of production is endogenously determined by the charac­
teristics and policies of two large countries.3
3Large is used here in the usual way in which it is used in Economics, meaning that the 
actions of each country can affect the equilibrium in the other country. However, throughout 
the chapter, the fact that one of these two ‘large’ countries is, possibly much, smaller than the 
other plays a crucial role.
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3.3  T h e m odel
The world economy is composed of two countries, A and B. Country A  is 
the large country, with a population of N  agents, and country B  is the small 
country with a population of gN  agents, 0  < g < 1 . In each country every 
agent is endowed with two units of labor, which is the only factor of production, 
so that the total labor force in country A  and B  is LA =  2N  and LB =  2gN, 
respectively.
3.3.1 Cultural goods and preferences
Agents can consume a numeraire good Y  and a continuum of varieties of a 
cultural good, where j  denotes a particular variety and n the total number of 
varieties available for consumption. The quantity of Y  consumed by an agent 
of country i is denoted by yi and the quantity of each variety j  consumed by an 
individual agent of country i is denoted by Xi(j). Based on some common, and 
not explicitly modelled, characteristics, the varieties of the cultural good can be 
assigned to either of two sets A  and B. For example, if the cultural industry 
under consideration is the film industry, one can think of A  as containing all 
action films and of B as containing all introspective or psychologycally dramatic 
films. The number of varieties in A  is denoted by ua and the number of varieties 
in B  is denoted by nB. The subscript k G {A, B} in Xik(j) is used to denote 
the set to which a given variety j  belongs, e.g. XiA(j) is the consumption of 
variety j  by a consumer of country i if j  G A. In order to define a variety that 
belongs to set A  as typical of the culture of consumers in country A, I still need 
to introduce a preference relation according to which consumers in country A 
derive more utility from consuming a variety of type A  than from consuming a 
variety of type B. I do so by assuming that consumers in country i maximize 
the following utility function
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Ui = log yi + log ( /  a ikx i k ( j ) d j
\ J  o (3-1)
subject to
rn
P vV i + / P i ( j ) x ik{ j ) d j  =  2w , 
Jo
(3.2)
where a** =  a > 1 if i = k , a** =  1 if i ^  &, and 0 < 6  < 1. Furthermore, is 
the wage of an agent in country z, and Pi(j) is the price that she pays for one 
unit of variety j .
This utility function implies that consumers of country A (B) value cultural 
variety in itself, but attach higher utility to varieties that are in the cultural 
set A  (B). One can therefore define A  (B) as the set of goods that Eire typical 
of the culture of country A (B). Note that until now I have not yet specified 
anyhthing about the country where this varieties are produced, as the location of 
production will be derived endogenously in equilibrium. At this stage, a variety 
j  can be considered typical of the culture of country A  if, all else equal, it appeals 
more to consumers of country A  than to consumers of country B, irrespectively 
of where it is produced.
3.3.2 Production and market structure
The numereraire good Y  can be produced with a constant returns to scale tech­
nology with unit input-output coefficient, is sold on a perfectly competitive 
market, and can be traded at no transport cost between the two countries. The 
price of good Y  is normalized to one; this implies that, provided that some 
positive quantity of Y  is produced in both countries, as will be the case in equi­
librium, the wage rate is equalized between countries and is equal to unity. As 
for the cultural goods sector, each variety can be produced with the same in­
creasing returns to scale technology, which requires a fixed cost of F  units of 
labor, independently of the quantity produced, and a marginal cost of c units 
of labor per unit produced. I further assume that each producer regards itself
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as too small for its pricing decision to have an impact on consumers’ purchasing 
power and therefore that the market structure is monopolistic competition with 
large numbers. The total quantity produced of a given variety j  will be denoted 
by Xj.  Varieties of the cultural good can be traded between the two countries 
at some trade cost. I assume that this trade cost is of the “iceberg” type: r  > 1 
units of a given variety must be shipped from one country for one unit to arrive 
in the other country. Therefore higher values of r  correspond to higher transport 
costs. Throughout the model, I will use a superscript to denote the country in 
which a variety is produced, with xsik denoting the quantity of a given variety 
of type k produced in country s € {A, B} which is consumed by a resident of 
country £, X k denoting the total quantity produced by a firm that specializes 
in a variety of type k and is based in country s, and nsk the total number of 
varieties of type k produced in country s.
As an anticipation of the equilibrium results, it should be noted that country 
A, the large country, will be a net exporter of cultural goods and a net importer 
of food. This will also imply that national labor supplies will not be sufficient 
to pin down the number of varieties of cultural goods produced by each country, 
but that this will depend on the characteristics of demand, the relative size of 
the two countries and on transport costs.
3.4 E quilibrium  w ith  transport costs
Given the Cobb-Douglas form of the utility function in (3.1), we can use a 
two-stage utility maximization procedure to solve for the consumer problem. 
Consumers will allocate half of their income to the numeraire good and half 
to cultural goods. Therefore one can restrict attention to their maximizing the 
second term in the right hand side of (3.1) with a disposable income equal to 
one, given that each consumer has a total income equal to two and spends half
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of it on cultural goods.
Note that the elasticity of demand as perceived by producers is a = > 1 in
both markets and is independent of any other parameter of the model. Every
producer therefore charges the optimal (mill) price
p = ——— cw  = 1, (3.3)a — I
where the last equality follows from the fact that equilibrium wage rates are 
equal to unity in both countries and that, by way of normalization, I choose 
units of measurement for output so that c = Given this optimal pricing 
startegies, equilibrium profits for each producer are given by
K  = ^ - F .  (3.4)
A producer of a variety of type k in country s will be active in equilibrium 
if and only if irf. > 0 , which is the case if and only if X£ > crF. In a free entry 
equilibrium positive profits would be eroded by new entrants and we must have 
that X I < crF for all s, k £ {A, B}. Making use of these two conditions we have 
that in equilibrium n'k > 0  if and only if X k = crF and nsk = 0 if and only if
X k < aF. To see what this implies for the computation of the equilibium of the
model, one needs to express Xf. in explicit form for all k and s
X A =  ( x AA +  T g x B A ) N >
X B  =  ( x A B  +  T g x £ B ) N ,
(3-5)
X B = ( t x a b  +  9Xb b )  n > 
x a =  ( t x a a  +  9 x b a )  n -
At the optimum consumption plan, the marginal rate of substitution between 
any two varieties equals their relative price. In particular, for any i, k £ {A , B},
99
k, we have
4 t  =  <* " 4  and if,. =  (or) "x^. (3.6)
We can use (3.5) and the relationships in (3.6) to write the free entry conditions 
as
IIV (x a a  +  a~'7'r1“',0 x fB) N  < aF, (n A > 0), (3.7)
& II (a ~°x AA +  t 1~°9x bb) n  <  oF, S IV 3 (3.8)
x S  = +  9 x b b )  n  ^  vF, («B > 0), (3.9)
x l  = (T1_<rx^A +  oTcgx | B) N  < aF, (nBA > 0); (3.10)
where the constraint to which the complemenatry slackness condition applies is 
shown in parentheses at the right of each free entry condition.4 
The four rows of the left hand side of inequalities (3.7)-(3.10) are linearly in­
dependent for g < 1 and a, r  > 1 . This means that for any pair (xaa>xb b ) 
which constitutes a solution of this system, at most two of the four free entry 
conditions above can hold with equality. It can be shown that it will always 
be the case that = 0  and =  0 , that is a country never specializes in 
the varieties typical of the culture of the other country.5 Therefore if a variety 
typical of a given culture is produced at all, it is produced in the country where 
this culture is dominant. This means that I can focus attention on > 0 and
4Note that, although we chose to express the free entry condition in terms of xAA and xBB 
for future conveniency, we could have expressed them in terms of any other pair 
for any k , s  £ {A ,B} .
5The proof of this fact, the tedious details of which are omitted here, can be summarized 
as follows. Consider the equilibrium conditions (3.7) - (3.10) and the relationships implied by 
(3.6). If in equilibrium n A > 0 or n B > 0, and thus if (3.8) or (3.10) held with equality, then at 
least one of the other inequalities would be violated, which contradicts the initial assumption 
that this indeed an equilibrium. Therefore it must be the case that n A =  0 and n B =  0. 
Intuitively this is the case because it is clearly more profitable to produce a variety of type A  
in country A  than in country B , and a variety of type B  in country B  than in country A.
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n% > 0-6 I will now show that, for sufficiently high transport costs, the unique
equilibrium of the model has some production of varities belonging to both A  
and B (i.e., that n \  > 0  and nB > 0 ), whereas for sufficiently low transport 
costs, only varieties in A  are produced (i.e., that nA > 0  and nB = 0 ).
Assume that nA > 0 and nB > 0, so that (3.7) and (3.9) hold with equality. 
We can use (3.7) and (3.9) together to find the individual consumption levels 
xAA and x BB in this equilibrium
These individual consumption levels can then be used in the budget con­
straint of consumers to back out the equilibrium number of varieties of the two 
types. Taking into account that W{ = 1 and that pyVi =  1, the budget con­
straints specified in (3.2) can be written as
a F  1
N  1 + a~ar  
aF  1
gN  1 +  a_0Va l — a  ' (3.12)
(3.11)
n Ax AA +  n BTXAB =  1.
n ATXBA +  n%x%B =  1.
which, using (3.6), becomes
(3.13)
(3.14)
Using (3.11), (3 .1 2 ), (3.13), and (3.14) together I obtain
N  1 — gaT’ r  ° 
aF  l - a - ’T1-"  
N  g - a ^ T 1-"
a 1—a i
(3.16)
(3.15)
6In equilibrium it must be the case that is strictly positive, because if =  0 then 
n B  —  n A  =  n B  ~  9, which contradicts utility maximization by consumers.
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In this equilibrium, the total number of varieties, n = , is independent
of the level of the transport cost r  and of the preference parameter a and is given 
by7
n = n i  + n% =  ^  +a p N  ■ (3.17)
From (3.16) it is clear that an equilibrium with n f  > 0 only exists if r  > f ,
where
f  =  max , l} .
If r  < f , the equihbrium has n f  =  0  and =  n, where n is given by 
(3.17).8 Figure 3.1 shows how the share of the varieties typical of the culture of 
the small country in the total world production of the cultural industry depends 
on the level of trasport costs. Starting from high levels of r  an increase in 
economic integration, in the form of falling trade costs, decreases the number 
of varieties typical of the culture of country B  and increases the number of 
varieties typical of the culture of country A. If the size of the two countries is 
sufficiently different or the preference for own culture is not too strong, i.e. if 
g < a~a and therefore f  > 1 , there exists a threshold level of transport costs
below which the entire world market for the cultural good is taken over by
the varieties typical of the culture of the large country, and the small country 
completely specializes in the production of the numeraire good. 9 However, the
7This is because half of the labor force in the world is used to produce the numeraire 
good and half to produce the cultural varieties. Since the structure of our model implies that 
the quantity produced by each active firm, and therefore its labor demand, is independent of 
transport costs and of the preference paramemter a, so must be the total number of varieties 
produced in the world.
8Note that if the two countries are not too different in size or if the preference for own 
culture is sufficiently strong, so that g > a~a , the share of varieties typical of the culture of 
the small countries, n^ /n , is always positive.
9Note that results similar to those depicted in Figure 3.1 would obtain even if there were 
no difference in the culture of the two countries, i.e. if a = 1, although in this case varieties 
would only be disinguished by the location in which they are produced. However, the fact 
that a > 1 introduces interesting considerations for the welfare of the small country, which 
will be addressed below.
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Figure 3.1: Share of B  varieties in world cultural production.
fact that globalization reduces the provision of varieties that are typical of the 
culture of the small country does not necessairly mean that this country is made 
worse off, as many commentators seem to imply. In the context of this model 
an increase in economic integration has two opposite effects on the welfare of 
consumers in the small country. On the one hand it changes the composition 
of cultural provision in an unfavorable way, since it reduces availability of their 
preferred varieties and increases the availability of varieties that they value less. 
On the other hand, a decrease in real transport costs, which in this section are 
a net social loss, favors consumers, as they have more resources to spend on any 
good. The net effect of a fall in r  on the welfare of consumers in country B  can 
be evaluated by computing their indirect utility
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[ M l  +  0 - ^ ) 1 V'& —  rr?------- if r  > f
(3.18)
<j F otherwise
It is straightforward to verify that the welfare of consumers in the small 
country always increases as a consequence of a decrease in transport costs, since 
cr > 1 . In this model the direct welfare gain due to a decrease in wasteful 
trade costs always offsets the indirect negative welfare effect that the latter 
has by causing a decrease in the production of B  varieties. However, the next 
section shows that if economic integration takes the form of a reduction in trade 
protection instead of a decrease in real transport costs, this strong result is not 
warranted anymore, since the small country could experience welfare losses from 
integration.
In the previous section an increase in the degree of economic integration nece- 
sarily benefited the small country, because it was associated with a reduction in 
real transport costs. However, this section shows that some degree of trade pro­
tection, in which tariff revenues are redistributed to consumers, can increase the
number of varieties typical of its culture. Trade protection is more likely to 
increase welfare in the small country if this country is not too small and if pref­
erence for own culture is very strong. In what follows I consider the symmetric 
case in which both countries impose the same ad valorem tariff of (t — 1 )% on 
each imported unit, so that, given that equilibrium f.o.b. prices are equal to one, 
consumers in each country have to pay a price t > 1 on each imported unit. 10
10I limit my analysis here to the symmetric case for simplicity. The case in which only the 
small country imposes a tariff yields a more complicated and less realistic solution, as in this 
case any positive tariff level would cause the small country to completely specialize in the 
production of cultural goods and would affect the terms of trade, by raising the wage rate in
3.5 Trade p rotection
welfare of the small country by encouraging production of a sufficiently large
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The solution of the model with trade protection is similar to the solution of the 
model with transport costs presented in the previous section. In particular, the 
equilibrium is characterized by equations (3.3) through (3.16) where t~a should 
be substituted for r l~a everywhere. However, changes in the tariff rate t have 
a different effect from changes in the real transport cost r  on consumers wel­
fare as they do not entail direct net losses or gains in productive resources, but 
introduce a wedge between the relative prices of different varieties as perceived 
by consumers and their true relative social costs. More precisely, both changes 
in transport costs and in tariff rates affect the shares of varieties of type A  and 
B in the market. Futhermore transport costs decrease the purchasing power of 
consumers, as can be seen in equations (3.13) and (3.14), but do not entail any 
distortions at the margin of the quantity consumed, as the relative price of an 
imported variety and a domestic variety, r  is equal to their relative social cost. 
On the contrary, tariff rates do not affect the purchasing power of consumers, as 
their revenue is entirely redistributed for the purpose of consumption of cultural 
variety, but make the price of imported varieties relative to domestic varieties, t , 
greater than their relative social cost, which is equal to one, causing consumers 
to consume too little of them. The total effect on the welfare of consumers in the 
small country B  of a change in the bilateral tariff rate t depends on the balance 
between the positive effect on the composition of production and the negative 
effect of the distortion at the margin of the quantities consumed. To evaluate 
the relative strength of these two effects one needs to consider the equilibrium 
indirect utility of consumers in country B, which is given by
the small country. The symmetric case considered here therefore rules out any terms-of-trade 
motive for an optimal tariff, and focuses only on the effects that the bilateral tariff has on 
the composition of production and the allocation of consumption. This special case could be 
interpreted as the level of bilateral trade protection, if any, that a small country (e.g. France) 
should try to obtain in trade negotiations (e.g. the 1993 GATT protocol) with larger countries 
(e.g. the USA).
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optimaI
Figure 3.2: Optimal tariff for small country B.
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i i t > t
otherwise,
(3.19)
where t =  (pa*7)-1^ .
Although few general results can be computed in closed form, in what follows 
I rely on simulations to characterize the main results of this section. Figure 3.2 
provides a graphical characterization of the optimal tariff for any given size g < 1 
of the small country. The first thing to notice is that, as shown in the second 
line of (3.19), in order to affect welfare at all the tariff must be binding, i.e. it 
must be sufficiently high to prevent the disappearance of the cultural industry in
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the small country. The dahsed line in Figure 3.2 represents, for any given level of 
g, the threshold level t of t above which n% > 0 and below which n f  =  0. Notice 
that tariff levels below t have no effect on welfare, because they do not affect 
the consumers’ choice between imported and domestic varieties, since the latter 
are not available. Also note that smaller countries would need higher levels of 
protection in order to affect the composition of production at all and therefore 
their consumers’ welfare. The solid line in Figure 3.2 depicts the optimal tariff 
level, for any given g, on the assumption that n% > 0. However, for sufficiently 
small g, the tariff level represented by the solid line is inconsistent with the 
assumption that n f  > 0, since it lies below the dashed line. The optimal tariff 
level as a function of g is therefore represented by the solid line in Figure 3.2, 
provided that this lies above the dashed line, i.e. provided that g > g. One 
can see that the optimal level of protection increases as country size decreases 
up to the threshold size <7, below which any tariff level in the shaded region is 
optimal and not binding, implying that effectively undistorted trade is optimal. 
The intuition behind this result is as follows. If a very small country wanted 
to improve the welfare of its consumers by promoting production of varieties 
typical of the country’s culture, it would have to levy a very high tariff. The 
consumption distortion implied by this high tariff may however be so great, 
that the country would maximize welfare by allowing free trade. This result is 
interesting, as it could explain why relatively large countries like France embrace 
a very active trade policy on cultural products, whereas small countries like 
the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands have historically had a laissez- 
faire attitude towards the import of foreign, and especially American, cultural 
products.
It should also be noted that country A, the large country, always loses from 
bilateral protection, as this would not only introduce a consumption distortion 
but would have the additional negative effect of affecting unfavorably the compo­
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sition of cultural production. 11 This might explain why the United States are so 
strongly opposed to the “cultural exception” principle that excludes audio-visual 
material from trade liberalization agreements.
It is important to notice that in this model the argument for the welfare 
improving adoption of trade protection by a not-too-small country hinges cru­
cially on a being strictly greater than one, i.e. on the existence of a need for 
cultural diversity, and on the asymmetry in size between countries, i.e. on g 
being strictly less than one. For a =  1 bilateral free trade is always optimal for 
the small country. This is because, when a = 1 , the composition of production 
between type A  and type B  products becomes irrelevant for consumers. There­
fore a positive tariff would have the only negative effect of introducing a wage 
between relative prices and true relative social costs of imported and domestic 
varieties. Similarly, even if a > 1 , bilateral free trade is optimal for both coun­
tries when g = 1. This can be seen from equations (3.15), (3.16), and (3.17), 
which for g =  1 imply =  N /a F  for all r  (or, in the notation of this
section, for all t). Therefore, in the case of countries of equal size, levying a 
positive tariff would not affect the composition of cultural production (which is 
the only possible source of gains from protection in this model) but would still 
introduce a consumption distortion at the margin, damaging both countries.
3.6 C onclusions
This chapter has presented a two-country model of international trade in which 
consumers derive some utility from product varieties that are typical of the 
culture of the other country but, all else equal, prefer product varieties that are 
typical of the culture of their own country. All varieties are produced with the 
same increasing returns to scale technology in a monopolistically competitive
11 However, in an imperfectly competitive setting like the present one, saying that the large 
country prefers bilateral free trade is not the same as saying that it would prefer unilateral 
trade liberalization in the face of trade protection by the small country.
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market and can be traded, possibly at some cost, between the two countries. 
This model has been used to analyze the effects of globalization, in the form of 
a decrease in trade costs, on cultural diversity and on the welfare of consumers, 
especially of those in the small country. The results of the model show that 
globalization can indeed decrease cultural diversity, but that this might not, 
and in this instance does not, impose a welfare loss on consumers in the small 
country. The model also shows that a small positive tariff can improve the 
welfare of a small country, provided that this country is not too small.
I feel that the analysis outlined in this chapter can help shed some light 
on a much debated issue, which is at the forefront of the political debate in 
France and is receiving considerable attention also in other countries. If French 
consumer really value their cultural products substantially more than American 
products, the French government might actually be right to protect their market 
from imports of the latter, as the free trade equilibrium involves an externality 
which causes French varieties to be under-supplied. Obviously, it is difficult to 
know whether current levels of protection are optimal or eccessive, and there is 
no way to check whether this alleged preference of the the French people, and 
not only of French elites, for French films is actual or if it is a pretext used by 
the very vocal French film industry to secure protecion.
One should also notice that in the model of this chapter cultural goods 
have been treated as private goods, the consumption of which only benefits 
the individual who purchases a given good. An argument can be made, and 
has indeed been made by the French, that there is some aspect of public good 
to cultural consumption. The showing of a French film can not only provide 
entertainement to the viewer who is paying the admission ticket or the price of 
the video-cassette, but can also help preserve the vitality of French language 
and culture, an aspect that neither viewers nor producers are likely to take 
into account when taking their decisions. The public good nature of cultural
109
productions would therefore lead to underprovision of cultural goods, and could 
constitute another reason for government intervention. However, one should 
notice that the public good argument for government intervention is valid also 
in autarky, and it is not clear at all how international trade in itself would make 
the underprovision of cultural goods with respect to the optimum a more serious 
problem and therefore government intervention more desirable. This aspect of 
the issue has not been considered in this chapter and seems to constitute an 
interesting extension of the model presented here.
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